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ABSTRACT
Rising inequality affects the dynamics of macroeconomic variables both at home
and abroad. Abroad, Rising inequality causes an over-accumulation of foreign as-
sets, creating persistent current account deficits. Inequality leads to rises in govern-
ment transfers, and if raising tax revenue through a progressive income tax system
is increasingly costly, sovereign nations could accumulate on debt and increase their
default risk. At home, rising inequality in income increases household debt accu-
mulation, which increases the probability of a household default crisis. This thesis
examines the mechanisms behind the relationship between rising inequality and the
above macroeconomic variables, and offers some policy recommendations. In the first
chapter, I examine the relationship between top income inequality and the current ac-
count. Using panel error correction methods I observe a long-run relationship between
rising top income shares and falling current account conditional on highly progressive
income tax systems. Since tax revenues rise with top income inequality if marginal
income taxes are progressive, the negative conditional relationship appears either if
fiscal revenues are transferred to households who become more avid consumers, or
if government expenditure increases along the inequality trend. I incorporate these
findings into a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the effects of the top
and bottom income tax cuts on the current account and fiscal balance. As the in-
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come share at the top rises, a tax cut at the margin to them improves the current
account, since top income households are generally savers, but hurts the fiscal bal-
ance through revenue reduction. On the other hand, a bottom tax cut lowers the
current account balance but does not have much of an adverse impact on the fiscal
balance. In the second chapter, I examine how inequality increases the probability of
sovereign default by studying the Latin American default episodes of the early 1980s.
The sovereign borrows for the purposes of redistribution and to cover government
expenditure. Default on sovereign bonds occur when the one time increase in utility
of poor households due to higher transfers outweighs the risk of remaining in autarky
for an extended period of time, and the resource cost of raising revenue through a
more progressive income tax system becomes too high. In the third chapter, I exam-
ine how accumulation of household debt contributes to the probability of household
crisis, which leads to an initial decrease in inequality but a persistent rise afterwards.
Idiosyncratic increases in the income of impatient households increase their borrowing
due to the rise in consumption of durable goods, but act as a pecuniary externality
on other impatient households by driving up the interest rate. As a result the risk of
an economy wide crisis rises. Inequality in income and wealth has significant implica-
tions for the dynamic decision making of households and governments, and widening
inequality often leads to the accumulation of debt for households and governments
alike. Knowing the mechanisms behind these relationships is important for the design
of policies both for institutions that oversee the redistribution of wealth, as well as
for institutions that oversee the financial markets of a country.
viii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis attempts to understand how rising inequality affects the macroeconomic
dynamics of a nation. More specifically, it attempts to understand how inequality
in income and wealth enters into the dynamic decisions of households and sovereign
governments, and how those decisions jointly determine the risk of domestic financial
crises and external default crises. In the past three decades, nations all over the
world has experienced widening inequality in income and wealth, the magnitude of
which is unprecedented since the beginning of the 20th century. In many parts of the
world, this rise in inequality is also associated with rising household debt, while in
others, rising sovereign debt that inevitably leads to either domestic banking crises
or sovereign default crises. During those crisis episodes, growth often slows, and
inequality narrows until eventually the nation picks itself out of the downturn, starts
growing again, followed by eventual rise in inequality and increased indebtedness of
sectors of the economy that paves way for the fragile system to fall again. In this
paper, I document how inequality is associated with the Latin American sovereign
default episodes of the early 1980s, how it is related to the more recent persistence
in current account deficits in many OECD countries, and how inequality is related
to rising household debt in the United States that can explain a large part of the
financial crisis. In the thesis I also turn towards a theoretical approach in explaining
why these relationships could be such.
In discussing inequality, one inevitably moves away from the usual representative
2agent models popularly used in business cycle theory. All models in subsequent chap-
ters will have “heterogeneous” elements in them. In chapters one and two, I consider
two types of households in a nation: One rich, the other poor. Under this framework,
in chapter one I ask what type of preferences must be exhibited by the households in
order to get the patterns of rising top income inequality and falling current account in
recent decades observed in OECD countries. In chapter two, the same framework is
used in understanding the motive behind sovereign debt accumulation, and through
the addition of a government budget constraint, the motivation behind the sovereign
default episodes experienced in Latin American countries beginning in the early 1980s
until the early 2000s. In chapter three, I expand the number of agents to allow indi-
vidual income shocks to influence overall inequality. Under this framework I want to
understand how forces that lead to widening income gap can work through prices to
influence the market for household debt, so that rising inequality plays an important
role in determining the system-wide financial risk of a country.
1.1 Inequality, Indebtedness and Crisis
The issue of inequality has been an important topic in economics throughout the
modern period. Karl Marx’s theory puts a lot of attention on how capitalism as a
system oppresses workers in order to reap larger and larger benefits from them, leading
to ever rising inequality in wealth which will lead to the worst kind of social unrest –
revolution. Although regarded more as a social commentary and less as an economic
theory, it does highlight the importance of inequality in generating the social and
political narrative that feeds back to economic stability and growth. In the second half
of the twentieth century, economic growth has lead to much of the world’s population
leaving poverty behind. Growth in domestic output became the primary concern.
This focus is also greatly influenced by Kuznets (Kuznets, 1955) who conjectured the
3inverted U-shape between development and inequality, adopted and followed up in
the United States by Reagan’s assertion of the tenets of ”trickle down” economics.
Kuznets merely stated an empirical observation of the relationship between nations’
income and their inequality at the time of his writing, and that perhaps nations follow
a certain trajectory in development; he was deliberate in not theorizing why the curve
is the case, and in fact gave caveats for how not to interpret his findings. He wanted
the world at the time to be hopeful of future economic development, amidst scares
of poor countries at the time been stuck in perpetual underdevelopment and extreme
poverty a la Malthus. Much later, the Reagan administration attempts to convince
the audience that inequality is not as important as the topic of growth, because
growth in absolute numbers eventually leads to narrowing inequality somehow as a
force of nature. This is certainly the attitude of the People’s Republic of China, and
many nations experiencing rapid growth much later than the western hemisphere post
war in the 20th century.
Interestingly, of late the world economy has witnessed the disappearance of the
Kuznets curve pattern of growth and inequality, and the reversal in the decline of
inequality in many European countries that are seemingly “developed”. This lead
to the reexamination of Kuznets’ claims eventually cumulating in Piketty’s (Piketty,
2014) work that asserts that rising inequality is in fact the trend for growing countries
under a capital intensive production system, and what Kuznets observed is only
incidental due to government polices that largely stymied the widening of inequality,
which is idiosyncratic in nature. Another theory emerges to claim that inherent in
a capitalistic society are these “Kuznets” waves, theorized by Milanovic (Milanovic,
2016), who identifies sets of “malign” vs “benign” forces that leaps forth onto the
pages of history and leads to rises and falls in inequality. Milanovic’s conjecture
is influenced heavily by Goldin and Katz (Goldin and Katz, 2009), who views the
4experience of inequality in the better half of the last century as a race between
technology and education. Milanovic views the experience of inequality around the
world as a race between the malign and benign forces that shape it; war and plague as
a malign force that shrinks inequality and suppresses growth, while institutional shifts
or formation of workers’ unions as a benign forces that reduce inequality. Still other
benign forces of globalization could lead to increases inequality while growth increases,
while some malign force might arise to bring about decline in growth coupled with
rising inequality instead.
Meanwhile, the world economy seems to have grown more fragile. With the lib-
eralization of trade and the integration of international financial markets, citizens in
developing markets gained access to cheap credits not seen before. Governments of
developing nations are able to finance their budget through external borrowing, lead-
ing to large sovereign debts and persistent current account imbalances when viewed
in combination with the private sector. This lead to the Latin American sovereign
debt crisis, the Asian financial market crisis, and the 2008 global financial crisis that
are still making its rounds in EU peripheral nations.
This thesis explains how inequality leads to more debt undertaking in sections
of the economy, through preferences of households for comparison in consumption
patterns, through the dynamic optimization behavior of governments with the goals
of maximizing a nation’s welfare, and through the structure of the financial market
itself. Along the way, with empirical understandings of the relationships and theo-
retical discussions on the causes, I offer policy recommendations that either reduces
inequality in income, and how it impacts the accumulation of household or sovereign
debt, which in turn influences the propensity for household or sovereign debt crisis.
51.2 Role of the Financial Sector
Rising inequality and its relationship to varying kinds of crisis cannot materialize
without the existence of extensive domestic and international financial markets. Of
course if financial markets worked perfectly, inequality would eventually be reduced
as idiosyncratic shocks can be eliminated through the market for individual risk. It is
certainly the case in the past one hundred years that financial markets has experienced
tremendous growth, benefiting entities with demand for credit with immediate cash
flows, as well as benefiting entities with supply for credit with a higher return on
investment through efficiency in the delivery of information. However, one must
recognize the cyclical nature in the financial sectors, an almost rinse and repeat
pattern of credit expansion, crisis and contraction (Rajan, 2011).
In this thesis, while in chapter one I assume a perfect global financial market,
in chapter two and three crisis emerges endogenously. In chapter two, the market
for sovereign debt is incomplete. There is only a one period discount bond with one
price, against the many possibilities for the allocation of resources and the realization
of government spending. Under this framework, default arises endogenously when a
sovereign weighs the cost of default against the benefit of non-repayment. In chap-
ter two, an exogenous probability distribution function of crisis is assigned for the
domestic credit market, according to the amount of debt each individual household
has within the period. Borrowers in this domestic credit market are constrained from
borrowing by the amount of durable goods they currently hold, and a loosening of
this constraint leads to large increases in the crisis probability economy-wide. The
assumption of the financial market structure in the modeling section of the chapters
are important in obtaining the relationship between inequality, indebtedness, and
crisis.
In the next chapter, I theorize a relationship between top income inequality and
6current account. The chapter begins with an examination of the empirical evidence
that links large top income inequality with persistent current account deficits in many
OECD countries. With the correct specification of the household utility function,
I can replicate this relationship in a dynamic general equilibrium model, which is
used for taxation policy experiments to understand the tradeoff between policies that
reduce income in inequality versus policies that reduce the current account deficit.
7Chapter 2
Top Income Inequality, Income Tax
Progressivity and the Current Account
As the world becomes increasingly globalized, nations face two categories of chal-
lenges in recent history: rising inequality, and persistent external imbalances. This
paper addresses these issues, and finds that the two challenges are crucially related to
each other, through households’ consumption and savings behavior within a nation.
In exploration of the empirical evidence and the formulation of the theory behind it,
we find important implications relating to the trade-off governments face in design-
ing their taxation policies concerning these issues, which deserves much attention in
current economic conversations surrounding the United States.
There is an emerging puzzling development in international macroeconomics, that
is as income share for the top percentile income earners continue to rise, current ac-
count balance worsens for many OECD countries. Current account is a reflection of
the nation’s aggregate consumption, investment and savings behavior. If we are to
think that the top income percentiles are bigger savers, we should anticipate rising
top income inequality to be correlated with a rising current account, as traditional
economic theory tells us. Many researchers have written about this puzzling phe-
nomenon, most notably Kumhof et. al. (Kumhof et al., 2012) in a recent IMF
research paper. I explain this phenomenon using two forces, primarily in a dynamic
small open economy setting. First, following others I incorporate a keeping up behav-
ior in consumption of the poor, so that as inequality rises, the poor actually consumes
8more by borrowing a higher proportion of what they earn in order to close the ris-
ing consumption gap. Secondly, keeping up behavior is accelerated by a progressive
marginal income tax system, which taxes the top income earners more and provides
a larger windfall in disposable income to the poor, either through higher transfers or
a tax break, who in turn borrows more against the disposable income rise to consume
in the backdrop of rising inequality.
As is with most international macroeconomics topics, movements of key vari-
ables are best understood with simple national accounting. With national accounting
equations that equate the current account and fiscal account to aggregate savings
and spending, I show that as top percentile income share rises, ceteris paribus a
nation’s current account deteriorates if the lower income households consume more
beyond their means even as their share in income of national output declines. I then
test these claims empirically, using error correction methods for a panel of OECD
countries.
Then, for policy implications, along rises in top income shares, a tax cut to the top,
which makes the marginal income tax system less progressive, improves the current
account, because the windfall in disposable income through transfers or tax cuts to the
poor are reduced, but worsens the fiscal account. Whereas a tax cut to the bottom,
making the marginal income tax system more progressive worsens the current account
as the poor more than consumes the windfall, but does not impact the fiscal account
much, because as top income share rises, more weight on tax revenue collection rests
on the top income earners.
Along the veins of Duesenberry (Duesenberry, 1949) and more recently Belabed
et. al. (Belabed et al., 2013), this paper brings the idea of interdependent consump-
tion preferences to the foreground. Lower income households reference high income
households when making current period consumption-saving decisions, and the rise
9in consumption of high income households entices lower income households to con-
sume beyond their means in an effort to catch up in consumption. If this type of
consumption externality is present, a progressive marginal income tax policy of the
governing body, with the aim of providing larger transfers or more tax cuts to the
lower income households, exacerbates the current account deficit problem, as wind-
fall income provided to lower income households are all but consumed, whereas high
income households would have saved much of the untaxed earned income. Thus the
contributions of this paper is two-fold. First, to my knowledge, this paper is the first
to discuss the influence of consumption externality on the relationship between rising
top income share and the current account in a dynamic general equilibrium model.
Secondly, within this body of research, public savings behavior is often neglected.
Since current account is the summation of aggregate private savings and public sav-
ings behavior, and surmising that fiscal policy in the form of income taxation and
spending has an important role to play in the determination of the nation’s current
account, I put an emphasis on fiscal behavior in the dynamic model.
Looking at the United States as a case in point, the late 1990s to early 2000s were
marked with a period of exceptional growth, but the growth was not without any
exceptional problems: inequality grew while the current account plummeted. On the
other hand, fiscal deficit, increasing until the early 1990s recovered before dropping
again sharply beginning in the 2000s. There was a sharp drop in the top marginal
tax rate in the mid 1980s, and an eventual rebound of marginal income tax levels for
the top bracket to slightly higher than the peak in the decade before. It then stayed
constant over the last decade of the twentieth century, where the richest income tax
bracket in the United States paid 35% more tax on the margin than a person with
average income. At a first pass, it certainly is true, that as marginal income tax
progressivity, especially tax rates for those at the top rose, a budget improvement
10
followed while the current account dropped for the United States, all along the rising
trend of top income shares.
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Figure 2·1: U.S. Inequality, Deficits and Growth, 1985 - 1995
Left panel shows rising inequality and dropping current account from 1990’s to mid 2000’s.
Right panel shows a rise in top bracket marginal income rate in the 1990’s, and a rise in
the fiscal balances.
For different countries, the experiences in inequality and current accounts are
different. Rising inequality and falling current account is not a received wisdom
among OECD countries, as in France and UK, where current account surpluses and
rising inequality track each other from mid 1980’s to mid 2000’s, or in the case
of Spain, where inequality at the top has actually dropped while current account
improved. Of course, owing to how the government collects taxes and spends the
revenue on outlays, the budget experience will also be vastly different for these and
other OECD countries over the same period. It can be said that looking at country
averages from the mid 1980s to mid 2000s, Rising top income shares is correlated
with falling current account as well as fiscal account balances. Additional country
current account and top income inequality series are found in the appendix.
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Figure 2·2: OECD Deficits and Inequality, 1985 - 2005
Average top income share, current account balance and fiscal balance.
The puzzle of rising top income inequality and falling current account balance
observed for many OECD countries has so far been explained in two directions. First,
it is postulated that people’s consumption and saving behavior differs at different
levels of inequality. For example, Kumhof et. al. imagines that the rich have a
preference for the holding of assets, but as inequality rises through rising dividend
income, actual wealth rises much more than that is desired, and they dissave, resulting
in a drop in the current account. Al-hussami has studied the phenomena assuming
there is a negative consumption externality on the poor exerted by the rich, so as
inequality rises the poor’s consumption decline is slower as they are becoming more
indebted in a two-period model. Another vein of research attempts to explain the
observed relationship between inequality and the current account through access to
international financial markets as well as through the development of local financial
markets. Marzinotto postulates that rising inequality does not reduce the desire
for consumption of the poor, while rising inequality is associated usually with own
financial development and access to international capital markets, allowing the ever
poorer lower income households to be able to borrow more, bringing about the current
account deficit.
12
Not discounting that these forces are at work, I wish to ask the question of how
does the fiscal balance come into play? Current account is the summation of both
private saving behavior as well as public saving behavior. I contribute to the state of
current literature by stating that governments’ tax collection policies and expenditure
policies interact with preferences of households of differing income levels and give
different implications for the current account, as well as the fiscal account.
The paper is structured as follows. I first review previous literature on current
account, inequality, the relationship between the two, and existing literature on in-
equality and taxation. Then a simple textbook model is presented to understand the
underlying forces of inequality and marginal income tax progressivity on the current
account and fiscal account. I examine empirical evidence that suggests a correlation
between the current account and top income inequality that is conditional on the
marginal income tax progressivity of the nation, and build a dynamic model to offer
one explanation for the empirically observed correlation by way of matching those
findings. To conclude, we examine the circumstantial costs and benefits of different
tax cuts, namely cuts to the top versus to the bottom income households.
2.1 Literature Review
The relationship between current account and inequality has been studied before,
most recently by Kumhof et. al. (Kumhof et al., 2012), Al-hussami et. all. (Al-
Hussami and Remesal, 2012), and Marzinotto (Marzinotto, 2016). Kumhof et. al.
builds a dynamic two-country two-agent model, and adds two important features.
First, the rich within the model have a preference for wealth in assets. This way, a
rise in inequality through rising dividend income means a rise in wealth, but within
their model will be too much of a rise according to preferences. Hence the rich dissave,
current account falls as inequality rises. Secondly, thinking inequality as permanent
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shifts, they employ a global solution method to look at the affect of a rise in inequality
on consumption patterns and the current account. Al-hussami uses a simple two
period model to examine the same issue, but more directly employ a consumption
externality of consumption from the rich onto the poor, so when the consumption
of the rich is increasing drastically, the poor incur a decrease in marginal utility of
today’s consumption, and so borrows more and consumes more.
Within Kumhof et. al.’s framework, they attempt to explain why there are impor-
tant empirical outliers from their analysis by talking about financial markets. Since
the observation of most nations with rising inequality and falling current account
are Anglo-Saxon nations, they argue that the growth in top income share are mostly
finance led, and a well developed financial system is crucial for their results. While
for countries where we do not observe rising top income inequality and falling current
account, these countries have mostly export led growth, which raises their income and
not wealth, so top income earners in these countries still accumulate wealth through
assets. Their analysis depends crucially on the better developed financial markets
of nations with finance led growth that leads to the rise in inequality. Marzinotto
proposes that the rise in inequality is associated with the current account through
asset markets within the Euro Zone, that when inequality rises the country is more
likely to be integrated with the global economy, allowing the rich, as well as the
poor to borrow more and maintain high levels of consumption. Iacoviello (Iacoviello,
2008) builds a heterogenous model to explain in the U.S. case why household debt is
correlated with inequality over the long-run. Within his model there are impatient
agents who are borrowers and are credit constrained. Rising inequality with financial
liberalization increases the indebtedness of these households. His model can be easily
extended into a model of external debts, as is done in Callegari (Callegari, 2006).
Consumption externality of the type studied by Al-hussami et. al. has a long
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tradition within the field. The first of which is Duensenberry (Duesenberry, 1949).
In the analysis, Duensenberry first establishes the fact that households within the
United States, albeit having low levels of income, does not have proportionally less
consumption as compared to households that have a lot more in terms of disposable
income. He then proposes that consumption of households are in fact interdependent,
and that consumption of higher income households puts pressure on their neighbors,
who consumes a lot despite incurring larger debt. The same argument might be
extended to globally connected open economies, and as inequality rises, if investment
is held constant, the consumption of the poor, which is not falling as fast as the relative
drop in the ratio of disposable income between them and the rich, would imply a falling
current account balance. Behringer and van Treeck (Behringer and van Treeck, 2013)
did a similar study, where they found evidence for upward-looking status comparisons,
that as top income inequality rises, current account falls, although the relationship is
weaker for the Gini index. They also find that an increase in the corporate financial
balance leads to an increase in the current account, so that consumers do not “pierce
the corporate veil”, and corporate financial balance leads to disproportionate benefits
to the rich. More recently, Belabed et. al. (Belabed et al., 2013) develops a stock-flow
consistent model with what they termed upward-looking demand, so rising inequality
at the top will produce current account deficits, but also emphasized is the role
of institutions that facilitates the relationship. As upward-looking demand follows
directly from Duesenberry’s theory of interdependent preferences, they are the first
in introducing this old idea into the recent literature about global imbalances.
Another branch of literature examines what exactly people are consuming, and as
inequality rises whether it is changing the content of the import of nations. Fontagne
(Fontagne and Hatte, 2013) uses COMTRADE data to construct a dataset of luxury
import, which are premium products that are moved across nations. He finds a
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general rise in import of these products in the recent decade, and that is especially
true for the rising Asian economies. Ray and Vatan (Ray and Vatan, 2012), using
more detailed French import data, examines both theoretically and empirically how
rises in income of the richest people in the nation is in fact associated with rise in
luxury imports.
Recent advancements have also been made to look at experiences of income tax
progressivity of nations across the world. Sabirianova et. al. (Peter et al., 2008)
constructed a new dataset that summarizes the progressivity of the marginal income
tax system, they find that there is an overall decline of progressivity of income taxes
around the world. They also find a positive relationship between income tax pro-
gressivity and general government tax revenue for high income countries, while the
relation is weaker for low income countries.
2.2 Textbook Model
For intuition, I begin the analysis by looking at the national accounting identity for
net aggregate private savings:
S = Y − C − T
Assume a constant Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) of the rich and poor
households, and a progressive income tax system. Net aggregate private saving is:
S = αh(1− τh)Yh + αl(1− τl)Yl
Current account is defined as:
Current Account = Net Private Savings + Public Savings
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For a small open economy it is equivalent to:
CA = (Y − C − T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Private Savings
−I + (T −G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Public Savings
= (S − I) + ((τhYh + τlYl)−G)
Where the last term in brackets is the government’s fiscal balance. I make a
further assumption that government transfers x(τhYh + τlYl) of their tax revenue to
the low income households. Imagine moving one dollar of pre-tax income from the
hands of the poor to the hands of the rich; resulting changes in private savings and
current account are:
∆S ∆CA
αh(1− τh)− αl(1− τl) + αlx(τh − τl) αh(1− τh)− αl(1− τl) + (αlx+ (1− x))(τh − τl)−∆G
Table 2.1: Tabulation: Change in Savings and Current Account
With rising inequality the term that expresses the effect of progressivity of the
marginal income tax system on the current account is negative only if αl <
x−1
x
. So
the local poor households or whoever is receiving government transfers are borrowers
proportional to their disposable income, and that the transfer has to be a large enough
part of the rise in fiscal revenue due to the rise in income inequality. Fiscal balance
could go up or down, depending on how the rest of the increase in fiscal revenue is
spent.
2.2.1 Numerical Example
For a concrete numerical example, imagine the shares in income for the rich and the
poor are: {1
2
, 1
2
}. The rich have a savings rate of αh = 0.1. The poor have borrowing
rate of αl = −0.2. Tax is progressive, with tax rates of 30% on the rich and 10% on
the poor. Assume government transfers three quarters of its tax revenue to the poor
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households, and there is no other government expenditures. Net private savings in
this case is:
S =
0.1× 0.7
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rich Savings
− 0.2 +
Borrowing from Transfers︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0.2× 0.75× 0.3)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Poor Borrowing
= −0.09
If Inequality rises in the form of top income share from the current situation to
(2
3
, 1
3
), all else equal, current account improves:
S =
0.1× 0.7× 2
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rich Savings
− 0.2 +
Borrowing from Transfers︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0.2× 0.75× 0.3)× 2
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Poor Borrowing
= 0.03
This is at odds with the observed data. At least for OECD countries, we observe
that rising top income share is associated with worsening current account balances.
I add the consumption externality assumption in this simple numerical example for
intuition. Suppose that as a result of rises in top income share, poor borrows a larger
proportion of their income:
S =
0.1× 0.7× 2
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rich Savings
− 0.4 +
Borrowing from Transfers︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0.4× 0.75× 0.3)× 2
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Poor Borrowing
= −0.12
This is the classical “keeping up with the Joneses” argument first popularized by
James Duesenberry. Furthermore let’s look at a rise of top marginal income tax of
10%:
S =
0.1× 0.6× 2
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rich Savings
− 0.4 +
Borrowing from Transfers︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0.4× 0.75× 0.4)× 2
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Poor Borrowing
= −0.15
Here two distinct forces must be present in order for the current account to fall
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with rising top income shares: following the rise in top income shares, poor rate of
borrowing must have risen significantly; additionally, transfers from tax revenue to
these poor households must be sufficient large. Then current account decreases with
rising top income inequality as long as marginal income tax system is progressive.
More progressive the marginal income tax system, larger dip in the current account.
Net Private Saving Public Saving Current Account
Original Accounts -0.09 0.04 -0.05
Rising Top Income Share -0.03 0.06 0.03
More Poor Borrowing -0.12 0.06 -0.06
Add Rising Top Tax -0.15 0.08 -0.07
Table 2.2: Tabulation: Preferences and Savings
It is important to note that the example here deals with local conditions. As-
suming that inequality is high, so externality effect on the poor households is high,
additional transfers to poor households result in additional borrowing conducted by
them. Of course rising inequality do not always have to produce rising borrowing if
changes in progressivity is large enough and the effect of closing the gap in inequal-
ity and the consumption smoothing effect on that of the poor dominates. This has
important welfare implications, which is left for future research at this stage.
Notice also in this extremely simplified example public savings goes up by whatever
tax revenue is left over from transfers to the poor; thus a more progressive marginal
income tax system combined with higher top income shares always implies a more
positive fiscal balance. This doesn’t always have to be the case, and in the next
section I examine government spending behavior in responses to rising top income
shares.
In order to understand how to generate low income consumers that are borrowers
relative to their disposable income, I expand the simple textbook model further into
a two period model with interdependent preferences to look at instances where αl
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could be negative.
2.2.2 Two Period Model
In a simple two period model with no consideration of equilibrium effects, domestic
agents will borrow in period 1 and pay back in period 2 as long as they expect to
have growth in income in the latter period. Assume there are two types of households,
where household i maximizes the following two period utility function:
Maxu(c0i, c0j) + βu(c1i, c1j)
s.t.
(1− τ0i)Y0i = c0i + Si
(1− τ1i)Y1i = c1i + (1 + r)Si
The two types of households differ in the amount of income share they get from
the nation’s output in the first period. The two households also differ in preferences.
following Al-hussami and Duesneberry, I add a consumption externality term only on
the bottom income households; the utility of the rich will be represented by:
u(c0h) =
c1−σ0h
1− σ
While the utility of the poor will be represented by:
u(c1l) =
c1−σ0l
1− σc
−(1−σ)γ
0h
Where γ guides the strength of the externality experienced by the bottom income
households through top income households’ consumption. The first order conditions
for each of the households satisfy:
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c1h
c0h
= (β(1 + r))
1
σ
c1l
c0l
= (β(1 + r))
1
σ (
c1h
c0h
)γ(1−
1
σ
))
Substitute the Euler equation of the top income households into the Euler equation
of the bottom income households to get:
c1l
c0l
= (β(1 + r))
1
σ [1+γ(1− 1σ ))]
Denote B = (β(1+r))
1
σ and A = (β(1+r))
1
σ [1+γ(1− 1σ ))]. Notice that if consumption
of the rich today is larger than consumption tomorrow, consumption of the poor today
will be even larger; they will be borrowing too much. This implies the savings rate
for each type of agents will be:
Sh =
(1− τ1h)B
B + (1 + r)
Y0h − (1− τ0h)
B + (1 + r)
Y1h
Sl =
(1− τ1l)A
A+ (1 + r)
Y0l − (1− τ0l)
A+ (1 + r)
Y1l
Assume in the first period Y1 = Y¯ and Y2 = (1 + g)Y¯ , and in each period the
income share by the high income earners are µt and for low income earners are 1−µt,
furthermore income share is constant over the two periods, µt = µ¯. Income taxes
are constant over the two periods; government spending is exogenous, and G¯
Y
≥
τhη + τl(1− µ); assume government meets budget deficit by external borrowing.
Fiscal Balance
The government budget constraint is characterized by:
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BG = (τhµ+ τl(1− µ))Y −G− TR
Progressivity of the tax implies that if µ rises, the collected tax revenue rises.
Crucially, assume that government transfers a constant proportion of their taxes to
the poor households. This way, whenever there is a rise in top income share or
marginal income tax progressivity, transfers to the bottom income households will
increase.
Current Account
Summing up the savings function of each of the agents, adding government budget
and behavior to get:
CA
Y¯
= Sh + Sl + (1− x)(τhµ+ τl(1− µ))−G
Where
Sh =
(1− τh)µB
B + (1 + r)
− (1 + g)(1− τh)µ
B + (1 + r)
and
Sl =
((1− τl)(1− µ) + x(τhµ+ τl(1− µ)))A
A+ (1 + r)
− (1 + g)(1− τl)(1− µ) + x(τhµ+ τl(1− µ))
A+ (1 + r)
Using the assumptions about inequality and government fiscal behavior, the full
effect on the current account for a change in the nation’s level of inequality is char-
acterized by:
∆CA =
(B − (1 + g))(1− τh)
B + (1 + r)
− (A− (1 + g))(1− τh)
B + (1 + r)
+
x(A− (1 + g))(τh − τl)
A+ (1 + r)
+ (1− x)(τh − τl)−∆G
If (1+g) ≥ (β(1+r)) 1σ , rich will be borrowers today. Since the bottom households
experience the consumption externality if A > B, their borrowing rate out of their
disposable income is even larger. Notice that we arrive at the same results as Al-
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hussami, that given a level of top income shares, a rise in A, or rise in the consumption
externality conditional on (1 + g) ≥ (β(1 + r)) 1σ means current account deficit today
becomes even larger. Al-hussami et. al. talk about future rise in inequality versus
today, and if share of bottom income households to the total output is declining
tomorrow and those households discount the future large enough, current account
today still declines. I talk about permanent changes in inequality, both today and
tomorrow. If Inequality rises permanently, current period borrowing of the rich rises
proportionately if the above condition is true, but the borrowing of the poor will
rise even more as long as consumption externality is present. If this consumption
externality is large enough, government transfers will put more disposable income in
the hands of the poor, and their borrowing becomes larger based on how much their
total disposable income has risen as compared to how much disposable income of the
rich has risen. Thus, more progressive the marginal income tax system, more severe
the negative relationship between rising inequality and falling current account.
Previous research tried to link current account to the experience of rising top
income inequality of the country. What I have proposed is another piece of the puzzle
required to put the full story together, one that is not often addressed. Namely, the
government tax collection, redistribution and the fiscal balance side of the current
account. Government collection of taxes and transferring of tax revenue as a windfall
to households has an impact on the current account depending on how households’
savings behavior are changing as inequality rises. Within our framework, the negative
consumption externality is crucial in generating the results. As Dupor and Liu (Dupor
and Liu, 2003) pointed out, consumption externality is like pollution, so in equilibrium
the poor household are over-consuming in the first period if the rich are consuming
more in first period. Efficiency requires that rich consume much less in first period in
the presence of externality than without, which means they have to be incentivized
23
to save even more. If tax rates are adjustable in the two periods, a higher income tax
rate for the rich today than tomorrow is required for a social optimum.
I have so far ignored the supply side of the equation, by assuming that domestic
investment is not changing significantly when inequality of this type rises. Eggertson
and Krugman show that inequality has a big impact on aggregate demand that pushes
the real interest rate to near zero, affecting growth. The interaction between savings,
investment and imbalances is beyond the scope of the current paper, and is left for
future research.
2.2.3 Evidence From Country Averages
I present graphical depictions of average country current accounts and fiscal balances
over 1984 - 2005, grouping them in order of marginal income tax progressivity and
top 5% income inequality. Figure 2 shows the difference between top 5% income
share above and below the median, when at the 33rd, 66th and 99th percentile of the
marginal income tax progressivity data.
On average, rising inequality beyond the median within the marginal income tax
progressivity category increases the current account deficit, but when progressivity
is very high, the drop in current account is the largest. Countries with a more
progressive income tax system has a larger starting current account surplus; high
progressivity of marginal income tax might be correlated with things such as social
attitudes towards inequality, and people’s preferences in general about savings versus
consumption, which might be part of the reason we see the rise in current account
surplus when we observe countries with larger marginal income tax progressivity.
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Figure 2·3: OECD Current account to GDP ratio, 1995 - 2005
At different levels of marginal rate progression and top income inequality. Marginal income
tax progressivity are divided into three categories, at the 33rd, 66th and 99th percentile.
Top 5% inequality varies from above to below the median within each marginal income tax
category.
I show a similar graph plotting average fiscal balance (country and year) when
top income share is either above or below the median, for marginal rate progression
at the 33rd, 66th and 99th percentile. First, looking across progressivity levels we
see that higher progressivity of the marginal income tax is associated with larger
fiscal deficits. There are many reasons for the observed increases in progressivity, and
perhaps a larger fiscal deficit itself could prompt the government to put in place a
more progressive income tax system.
Secondly, rising inequality correlates with large drops in progressivity, and that
when marginal income tax progressivity is high, the drop in fiscal deficit is lower.
Inequality might drive a larger fiscal deficit if either government spending is rising, or
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transfer payments are rising; it is not very likely the case that tax revenue would be
dropping as marginal income tax progressivity is rising, since taxing the rich more,
who has a larger share in national income should be associated with a larger tax
revenue. In the high progressivity case, a rise in inequality beyond the median within
the progressivity category means larger revenue collection, hence despite other forces
that put a downward pressure on the fiscal deficit, inequality itself does not bring as
much of an increase in the fiscal deficit.
Figure 2·4: OECD Fiscal balance to GDP, 1985 - 2005
At different levels of marginal rate progression and top income inequality. Marginal income
tax progressivity are divided into three categories, at the 33rd, 66th and 99th percentile.
Top 5% inequality varies from above to below the median within each marginal income tax
category.
For a brief summary of the graphical representations of country averages, condi-
tional on the level of marginal income tax progressivity, rising inequality is associated
with differential amount of drops in the current account and fiscal account. Larger
progressivity of the marginal income tax system is associated with better current ac-
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count positions to begin with, but it is also associated with larger drops in the current
account when inequality is rising country to country. As for the fiscal balance, higher
marginal income tax progressivity is associated with larger fiscal deficits, but for a
income tax system that’s more progressive, the drop in the fiscal balance is much less
pronounced.
Figure 2·5: OECD Average Impulse Response, 1985 - 2005
Change in current account and fiscal balance to GDP when top 5% income share varies
from below to above the median, at lowest 33rd percentile of marginal income tax rate
progression versus at the 99th percentile of marginal income tax progression.
Looking solely at the differences in current account and fiscal balance drops we can
already infer some interesting policy consequences. If a nation with a relatively high
marginal income tax progressivity is considering a policy change to make their income
tax system less progressive (perhaps a tax cut to the top), and knowing that their
country is facing rising inequality, that move, ceteris paribus, from whatever current
account and fiscal balance positions they start with results in a somewhat slower rate
of deterioration of their current account, but makes them more susceptible to a much
faster rate of deterioration of the fiscal balance. I will formalize these findings in a
dynamic model in the latter section.
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2.3 Empirical Analysis
Based on the theoretical analysis, the formal empirical equation that should be esti-
mated is:
CA = β1TopInequality + β2TaxPorgressivity + β3TopInequality × TaxProgressivity +XB + 
I obtain gross top income shares data from the World Income Shares Database.
I use top income shares defined for the top 5% and 10%. I use marginal income tax
rate progression index obtained from World Tax Progressivity Database. Current
account dataset is obtained from the IMF External Balance Assessment data. The
database also includes variables that are important determinants of the nation’s cur-
rent account, so I include those to avoid problems of omitted variables bias. I follow
the IMF procedure, as used by Kumhof et al, and use a panel regression model with
panel-corrected standard errors and assuming the errors have a panel specific AR(1)
structure, in order to make our analysis comparable. In the modest sample, averaging
over the years Sweden has the lowest income share at the top 5% while the U.S. has
the highest share of income at the top, who take home 28% of the before tax share
in income.
2.3.1 Inequality, Marginal Income Tax progressivity and the Current Ac-
count
Interacting tax progressiveness with inequality, we should observe β3 to be negative,
because according the model, progressiveness of the income tax system should bring
about a decrease in the current account.
The regression results are left in the appendix. The coefficient on top income share
values are comparable to results from Kumhof et al. without the marginal income
tax progression variables. As I include the tax progressiveness index dataset, I lose
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some additional OECD countries. Adding the interaction between the top income
share and marginal rate progression, the coefficient on the top income share becomes
insignificant, while the interaction term is significantly negative. It seems to suggest
that for countries with higher marginal income tax progression, as inequality rises the
current account is lower. Previous paper finds the unconditional negative relationship,
but without the interaction term with marginal rate progression this relationship
might be the average effect; despite the significant limitation in data, I was still able
to capture some of the variations in the response of current account to an inequality
shock. Additionally, increases in top marginal income tax rate improves the current
account. However, to interpret those variables we have to take the interaction term
into consideration as well, and for countries with modestly high top income shares the
total effect could turn negative. Higher general government spending and general tax
revenue to GDP ratio decreases the current account, consistent with our expectations
from a national accounting perspective.
Using this type of factor dependent empirical strategy suffers from a special type
of omitted variable bias, where any state factors correlated with the current account
variable conditional on top income inequality might influence marginal income tax
progressivity as well and bias the result upwards or downwards. We cannot eliminate
this bias unless we can find every possible alternative factor variable, but one impor-
tant factor is as discussed in Marzinotto. Her paper postulates that rising inequality
is related to the current account through European Monetary Union (EMU) related fi-
nancial liberalization. Rising inequality correlates with rising current account deficits
only when these countries experience specific financial liberalizations that allow for
the accumulation of greater private debt. I include the factor variable denoting mem-
bership in EMU as well as the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index. The idea
is that if potential confounders of this form are at play, our estimates on the interac-
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tion between top income inequality and marginal rate progression should also change
significantly. Additionally, as in Al-hussami et. al., financial reforms at home might
also affect the relationship between inequality and the current account, differentially
from reforms or membership status to international bodies. I include the World Bank
financial reform index, and private credit to GDP ratio as additional factor variables
in our “horserace” regression. Adding those additional factor variables, our regression
coefficients are not significantly changed.
2.3.2 Dynamic Panel Regression
Observing obvious trends in top income shares, as well as in distinct periods of the
current account, I test key variables as well as the resulting regression residual for
unit roots. Using panel procedures, I cannot reject the fact that both top 5% income
share and current account are I(1) processes using conventional p-values using fisher
type unit root tests. As for the Marginal Income Tax Progressivity variable, I do not
fail to reject it being a unit root process. Interestingly, I do not fail to reject the null
hypothesis that the resulting regression residual is a unit root with usual confidence
intervals.
Fisher-type unit-root test Current Account Top 5% income MRP MRP × Top5% Residuals
Inverse Chi-Squared Statistic 43.9229 46.0857 56.2371 29.4421 101.6147
p-value 0.1186 0.0305 0.0096 0.4945 0.00
Inverse Normal Statistic -3.1471 0.4736 -1.5301 0.3225 -2.7681
p-value 0.2739 0.6821 0.0630 0.6265 0.00
Panels 17 15 17 15 15
Avg. Periods 18 16.8 18 16.8 16.67
Newey-West lags 2 2 2 2 2
Based on Dickie-Fuller tests. Inverse χ2 statistic requires number of panels to be finite.
Ho: All panels contain unit roots. Ha: At least one panel is stationary.
Table 2.3: Dynamic Panel: Unit Root Testing
This suggests one or more cointegrated relationships. In addition, I test for re-
gression variables using the same test with a time trend. When the Ho is that these
processes are random walks with a trend term, I will obtain similar results. Adding
one lag differences also yield similar results. These results calls for an error correction
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procedure, since both the independent variables and the dependent variables are I(1)
processes and the residual are I(0). This is the intuition for Kumhof et. al(Kumhof
et al., 2012). Error correction procedure asserts that there is a long run relationship
between the two variables, deemed the equilibrium relationship. the error term acts
as forcing variables that bring the model into the long-run equilibrium, while the
short-run coefficients can be simultaneously estimated. I first start with an ARDL
equation of the following form:
CAi,t = φ0,iCAi,t−1 + φ1,iCAi,t−2 + β0,ixi,t + β1,ixi,t−1 + µi + τt + i,t
Where the independent variable x includes top 5% income share, Marginal income
tax progressivity, their cross terms and similar control variables as included in Chin
et. al. Notice that I have added 2 lags of the current account dependent variable; for
robustness I will try to estimate models with one and both lags. The error correction
model is flexible to allow for multiple long-run relationships as well. This equation,
after some re-arranging, can be re-written into the error correction form. The equation
I estimate is:
∆CAi,t = α0,i [CAi,t−1 − θ0,ixi,t−1] + φ0,i∆CAi,t−1 + β0,i∆xi,t + µi + τt + i,t
Where α0,i = (1 − φ0,i), θ0,i = β0,i+β1,i1−φ0,i and η0,i =
φ1,i
1−φ0,i . Due to the limitation of
data, I use dynamic panel regression methods only, which gives us weighted country
averages of the long-run and short-run coefficients. I use the dynamic panel regression
method first applied in Frank (Frank, 2009) (2009) for state level long-run inequality
and growth regressions of the United States. Additional regressors in both short-run
and long-run are dependency ratio, old to working age population ratio, tax revenue
per GDP and the top statutory marginal income tax rate of the country.
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First, I examine the standard regression with only one lag in the dependent and
independent variables. I find a significant long-run relationship between top 5%
income share and the current account, at least for the twenty years period between
the OECD countries. In the long-run, a 30% top 5% income share converts to a
10.17% current account deficit on average, and a 1% increase in income share to
that percentile is associated with a 0.34% rise in current account deficit on average.
This relationship is unconditional on all other variables. The error-correction term
tells us about the speed of short-run adjustment to the long-run. Temporary rises in
inequality decreases the current account balance marginally, but in roughly 3-4 years
current account rises marginally back to the long-run values (half-life ln(0.5)
ln(0.497)
' 1).
I also find that in the short-run, the most important determinant of the current
account is government spending. Government spending reduces current account in
the three to four year short-run, but does not have much of an impact in the long-run.
Looking for a relationship conditional on marginal income tax progressivity I add the
interaction term in regressions 2 and 3. There is no strong evidence for a conditional
relationship.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Current Account/GDP Current Account/GDP Current Account/GDP
Adjustment Coefficient (α0) -0.517*** (0.0763) -0.519*** (0.0770) -0.466*** (0.0405)
Long-Run (η0)
Top 5% Income Share -0.328*** (0.101) -0.215 (0.319) -0.118 (0.772)
Marginal Income Tax Progression 0.0699 (0.276) 0.389 (0.810) 0.791 (0.936)
Top 5 % Income Share × MRP -1.753 (3.839) -4.118 (4.521)
Top marginal Income tax rate -0.0929 (0.0697) -0.0967 (0.0679) -0.112 (0.0762)
Government Spending / GDP 0.0266 (0.281) 0.0406 (0.286) 0.225 (0.383)
Private Credit / GDP -0.0328 (0.0210) -0.0344 (0.0216) -0.0295 (0.0202)
Net Foreign Asset / GDP 0.0698*** (0.0203) 0.0686*** (0.0197) -0.136 (0.104)
Capital Account Openness 0.0248* (0.0139) 0.0257* (0.0145) 0.187 (0.219)
Financial Reforms Index 0.00378*** (0.00121) 0.00383*** (0.00119) -0.00759 (0.0155)
Top 5 % Income Share × NFA 0.828** (0.403)
Top 5 % Income Share × KA open -0.848 (1.128)
Top 5 % Income Share × FRI 0.0525 (0.0759)
Short-Run (β0)
D.Top 5% Income Share -0.0699 (0.144) -0.247 (0.299) -2.617 (1.706)
D.MRP 0.385* (0.213) -0.161 (0.636) -0.414 (0.631)
D.Top 5 % Income Share × MRP 2.867 (3.558) 3.948 (3.590)
D.Top marginal Income tax rate 0.0303 (0.0383) 0.0326 (0.0384) 0.0292 (0.0414)
D.Government Spending / GDP -0.631*** (0.213) -0.625*** (0.209) -0.632*** (0.180)
D.Private Credit / GDP -0.0219 (0.0188) -0.0208 (0.0184) -0.0337 (0.0216)
D.Net Foreign Asset / GDP 0.0225 (0.0156) 0.0219 (0.0153) 0.0462 (0.0560)
D.Capital Account Openness 0.0322* (0.0193) 0.0328* (0.0197) -0.366 (0.271)
D.Financial Reforms Index -0.000218 (0.00148) -0.000339 (0.00142) -0.00581 (0.0116)
D.Top 5 % Income Share × NFA -0.0745 (0.227)
D.Top 5 % Income Share × KA open 1.994 (1.405)
D.Top 5 % Income Share × FRI 0.0246 (0.0524)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: Error Correction Model
Adding a second year lag of current account in the auto-regressive relationship,
I run the same type of conditional error correction model, allowing the correlation
between inequality and the current account to change when progressivity of the tax
system changes. The first column result for top income share is similar to Kumhof
et. al., but once I have added the interaction term, most of the explanatory power is
shifted towards that variable. I find that while for countries that have low marginal
income tax progressivity there is neither a long-run nor short-run relationship between
inequality and the current account, for highly progressive marginal income tax system
there does exist a long-run negative correlation, existing in the trends of both current
account and inequality. In the short-run, I also find that rising government spending
relative to GDP is an important correlate to current account deficits.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Current Account/GDP Current Account/GDP Current Account/GDP
Adjustment Coefficient (α0) -0.679*** (0.128) -0.696*** (0.126) -0.641*** (0.0900)
Long-Run (η0)
Top 5% Income Share -0.216** (0.0964) 0.188 (0.262) 0.438 (0.676)
Marginal Income Tax Progression 0.0266 (0.253) 1.117 (0.807) 1.468* (0.752)
Top 5 % Income Share × MRP -5.808 (3.774) -7.760** (3.769)
Top marginal Income tax rate -0.0603 (0.0460) -0.0744* (0.0424) -0.0847* (0.0453)
Government Spending / GDP -0.00692 (0.216) 0.0228 (0.210) 0.136 (0.293)
Private Credit / GDP -0.0390*** (0.0149) -0.0429*** (0.0162) -0.0407*** (0.0136)
Net Foreign Asset / GDP 0.0721*** (0.0171) 0.0704*** (0.0148) -0.0731 (0.0681)
Capital Account Openness 0.0218* (0.0126) 0.0218* (0.0123) 0.139 (0.184)
Financial Reforms Index 0.00376*** (0.00117) 0.00394*** (0.00108) -0.00238 (0.0139)
Top 5 % Income Share × NFA 0.569** (0.254)
Top 5 % Income Share × KA open -0.628 (0.951)
Top 5 % Income Share × FRI 0.0300 (0.0679)
Short-Run (β0)
LD.Current Account/GDP 0.278*** (0.0944) 0.296*** (0.0924) 0.283*** (0.0967)
D.Top 5% Income Share -0.0738 (0.151) -0.508 (0.335) -2.478 (1.893)
D.MRP 0.465* (0.249) -0.829 (0.691) -0.883 (0.791)
D.Top 5 % Income Share × MRP 6.808 (4.167) 6.795 (4.609)
D.toprate 0.0242 (0.0388) 0.0368 (0.0347) 0.0329 (0.0329)
D.Government Spending / GDP -0.542*** (0.197) -0.518*** (0.187) -0.509*** (0.152)
D.Private Credit / GDP -0.0243 (0.0172) -0.0225 (0.0185) -0.0344 (0.0233)
D.Net Foreign Asset / GDP 0.00568 (0.0151) 0.00300 (0.0140) 0.00967 (0.0381)
D.Capital Account Openness 0.0296 (0.0231) 0.0329 (0.0233) -0.337 (0.277)
D.Financial Reforms Index -8.23e-05 (0.00158) -0.000385 (0.00154) -0.00393 (0.0104)
D.Top 5 % Income Share × NFA 0.0172 (0.167)
D.Top 5 % Income Share × KA open 1.853 (1.454)
D.Top 5 % Income Share × FRI 0.0157 (0.0484)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: Error Correction Model: Additional Current Account Lags
As a side note, the interaction of top 5% income share and net foreign asset is
an important missing regressor that works in the opposite direction: as inequality
rises, higher net foreign asset leads to rising current account balance in the long-
run. If rising net foreign asset is correlated with the marginal tax progressivity, it
introduces potential bias to our regression coefficient. It is the case that adding this
and other potential regressors interacting with top income inequality, our interaction
term between Marginal Income Tax Progressivity and top 5% income share becomes
significant.
I have attempted to provide a potential explanation for the significant interac-
tion term, and the explanation depends crucially on behavior both of households and
government fiscal spending and transfers behavior. Namely, that despite rising in-
equality, lower income households are consuming more, and that government transfers
or spending must also be rising with inequality, if fiscal balance is falling. I provide
some evidence for either of these claims now.
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2.3.3 Marginal Income Tax Progression, Revenue and Spending
It is not surprising to find that tax revenue rises if the progressivity of the marginal
income tax is rising, as higher progressivity means that the authority can always raise
a larger amount of revenue from the rich, this is shown with country averages over
the years in the next graph. This is also one of the results shown more rigorously
in the Sabirianova et. al. paper. By Jensen’s inequality, if marginal income tax is
more progressive, a rise in inequality puts more weight on the top income share been
taxed at a higher rate, hence higher tax revenue in the period and holding government
spending constant, should result in lower fiscal deficits.
Figure 2·6: Tax Progressivity and Revenues
On the left, rising marginal income tax progressivity is associated with rising tax revenue;
on the right, rising marginal income tax progressivity is weakly associated with falling fiscal
balances.
Surprisingly, higher marginal income tax progression is not correlated with larger
fiscal surpluses from our sample. If anything the relationship might be negative. If
tax revenue is rising when marginal rate progressivity is rising, it doesn’t explain
the fact that fiscal balance is not rising. There are other factors that come into
play, for example government spending or transfers could be rising along income tax
progressivity. Upon a first pass examination, tax revenue does seem to be somewhat
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positively correlated with government spending.
Figure 2·7: Tax Revenue and Government Spending
We have already observed that falling fiscal balance is associated with rising in-
come inequality at the top 5%. To summarize, I find evidence that as as tax revenue
rises, government spending is rising, and as inequality at the top is rising, fiscal bal-
ance is dropping. With rising marginal income tax progressivity, we should observe
rising fiscal balances if tax revenue is rising and assuming spendings and transfers
remain constant. However that is not the case, at least as seen from country aver-
ages. I have not provided any conclusive causal results, but it seems that government
responds to rising tax revenue collected by a more progressive income tax system
by conducting more spending or by increasing household transfers, and that rising
inequality itself is another channel for fiscal deficits. I later build this intuition into
the dynamic general equilibrium model.
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2.3.4 Luxury Good: Who is Consuming More?
The most important part of the current account is net exports, of how much foreigners
consume our countries’ production minus how much we consume theirs. We can learn
a lot about the consumption pattern of the rich and the poor by looking at the content
of imports of various countries. One type of goods often traded between borders is
luxury goods: high quality products that serve mostly as symbols of status. If we
assume that the most luxurious contents of import are mostly bought by the top
income shares, then as inequality rises if we observe a much larger rise in the import
of luxury goods, we can conclude that it is most likely the rich that are increasing
their consumption. If we observe as inequality is rising there are rises in import but
most of it is in other non-luxury content, we can conclude that as inequality is rising
it is in fact mostly households not at the top percentile most likely consuming more
through import, even as inequality rises.
I now use import data to look at how top income inequality affect the import of
luxury goods. Data comes from COMTRADE, and I define luxury imports following
Fontagne (2013). Results show a decline of luxury to import ratio even as import to
GDP ratio rises as top income inequality rises.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES luxury/GDP luxury/import ratio import/GDP
Top 5% income share -0.1065*** -0.511*** 0.1345**
(0.0271) (0.135) (0.0603)
MRP -0.0477*** -0.281*** -0.0579
(0.0161) (0.0790) (0.0361)
Gov’t spending/GDP 0.0718*** 0.356*** 0.00900
(0.0259) (0.115) (0.0529)
Tax revenue/GDP 0.0865* 0.427* 0.2266**
(0.0496) (0.232) (0.0933)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.980 0.991 0.998
Number of countries 9 9 9
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: Luxury Good Panel Regression
Even luxury import to GDP ratio falls as inequality rises. This seems to be
consistent with the “keeping up with the Joneses” theory: as inequality rises, import
of all goods increase, but ironically the poor are consuming even more as their income
share declines. Keeping up with Joneses arose as a social commentary in the 1910’s,
and seems to have remained since then in our collective consciousness. Duesenberry
(1949) was prominent in bringing this old idea forward1, by stating that preferences
are interdependent, and consumption is based on relative consumption levels between
the rich and the poor. When the poor sees increasingly higher consumption levels of
the rich, they aspire to higher conspicuous consumption just the same. They might
not be able to afford the absolute top product in the world, but they are certainly
willing to dig into their savings for a perceived higher end imported product. The
coefficient on the marginal rate progression is also consistent with this hypothesis, as
progressivity increases, presumably the rich are paying more in taxes, while the poor
1Thorstein Veblen is credited with the original idea of “conspicuous consumption” and the idea
of overconsumption due to envy.
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are paying less taxes, and the lower income share spends every windfall dollar they
receive on achieving higher consumption.
There is no definitive answer as to whether keeping up with the Jones, or more
generally the penchant for avid consumerism is prevalent and deeply embedded in
our psyche as members of the modern society. However, it is an appealing story, and
at times, as Duesenberry has found, fits the US consumption and budget data much
better than traditional theories in his times. I will incorporate this effect and model it
as a consumption externality on the poor in our dynamic model, to examine whether
such theories would present a better empirical fit for our model results as well.
2.4 Dynamic Model
Mechanically, I build a two-agent two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with no capital, with government bonds issued to domestic top income share
households and an international net zero supply asset. I add an additional assumption
on the behavior of the bottom income shares, that they experience a consumption
externality from what the rich consumes. More specifically, their marginal utility
this period declines when the rise in consumption of the rich is higher, so that their
rate of consumption is higher when consumption of the rich is rising as well. With
this addition of consumption externalities I examine the effect of different tax cuts
to the rich and poor to find out the dynamics of current account deficit/surplus as
well as the fiscal deficit in response to changes in inequality, tax progressiveness and
government spending.
Previous sections suggest that marginal income tax progressivity is an important
modifier for the relationship between inequality and the current account. Progres-
sivity of the marginal income tax, or how one individual household enticipates the
entire taxation schedule to change is often outside of their determination; in the vein
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of research pioneered by Zha (Foerster et al., 2016), I use a Regime-Switching DSGE
model to further explore the theoretical link between tax progressivity, top income
share and the fiscal and current account. The dynamic regime switching model cap-
tures the nature of marginal tax changes overtime and encompasses it into household
behavior.
Figure 2·8: U.S. Marginal Rate Progressivity and Top Statutory Rate
I first start with fixed marginal income tax to the top 5% and the bottom 95%.
Then, I model a Markov process that determines the progressiveness of the income tax
system. Seen in the data in introduction, bottom marginal income tax has stayed rel-
atively constant over the period from the 1980s to early 2000s, while the top marginal
income tax has seen shifts in levels and persists for multiple periods before a shift
to a higher or lower level of marginal income tax rate. I assume that agents do not
know about the exact timing of these shifts, but they form expectations about the
probability of a rise in their marginal income tax given the regime they are in for the
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current period.
Finally, Home country’s growth rate and share to the top 5% are subject to exoge-
nous trend shocks. Particularly, top income share is defined as: yh = (µΓµ,t)(yΓy,t)
where
Γµ,t = Γµ,t−1gµ,t =
t∏
s=0
gµ,s
and ln(gµ,t) = (1− ρµ)gµ,ss + ρµln(gµ,t−1) + µt . On the other hand,
Γy,t = Γy,t−1gy,t =
t∏
s=0
gy,s
and ln(gµ,t) = (1− ρµ)gy,ss + ρµln(gy,t−1) + µt . I first present normalized variables by
using appropriate last period growth rates, and re-accumulate the trend to look at
the non-stationary equilibrium.
2.4.1 Local Households
Local high income households maximize their utility by choosing consumption, inter-
national asset holdings and holding of government bonds:
Max
ch,bh,bg
∞∑
t
c1−σh
1− σ
subject to their high income household budget constraint
ch =
(1− τh)µ
x
yh − (eqb′h − bh)− (qgb′g − bg)−
θ
2
(bh − bhss)2 − T
This results in the Euler equation for government bonds:
qg = βh
c′h
ch
−σ
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And the international asset price satisfies the following condition:
eq = βh
c′h
ch
−σ
− θ(bh − bhss)
Local low income household’s problem is to maximize consumption subject to low
income household budget constraint:
Max
cb,bb
∞∑
t
c1−σb
1− σ
s.t.
cb =
(1− τl)(1− µ)
1− x yh − (eqbb − bb)− T
This implies the following Euler equation for the price of the international asset:
eq = βb
c′b
cb
−σ
Consumption externality will change the functional form and the Euler equation
of the lower income households, as well as changing their responses to exogenous trend
shocks of top income shares which changes the consumption pattern of the rich. I
will add consumption externality in a latter section to isolate the effect of it in the
context of the model.
2.4.2 Foreign Households
Foreign high and low income share households will face the same utility maximization
problem; their behavior is characterized by their budget constraints. Foreign high
income household budget constraint:
cfh =
µf
x
yf − (qb′fh − bfh)−
θf
2
(bfh − bfhss)2
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And foreign low income household budget constraint:
cfb =
1− µf
1− x yf − (qb
′
fb − bfb)
Euler equation of the foreign high income households:
q = βfh
cfh
cfh
−σ − θf (bfh − bfhss)
And for low income households:
q = βfb
c′fb
cfb
−σ
To ensure that equilibrium exists, I also make the assumption that the discount
rate between the local low income households and the foreign low income households
are one and the same. In essence, international asset price is pinned down by dis-
count rate of the poor, and since the rich are more patient, they are suppliers of the
international asset, and this is determined by the asset adjustment cost function of
the local and foreign rich. Whatever they supply will be taken by either the local rich
or poor as per market clearing condition.
2.4.3 Government Budget
The government in our framework is very simple. Government has a variable amount
of spending G that it has to meet every period in order to operate, which they raise
through income tax. Income tax progressiveness fluctuates according to the specified
marginal income tax process, and whatever the difference is between spending and
tax receipt is that periods’ government borrowing or the bond supply, and a fiscal
rule governs lump-sum tax. As mentioned before only local top income earners will
be able to purchase this bond for saving.
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Lump-sum tax/transfers response:
T = φGG+ φbgbgh
Government budget constraint:
T = G− (τhµyh + τl(1− µ)yh)− x(qgb′g − bg)
The lump-sum tax response says that there could be a small increase in the tax
collection of the period, without changing the income tax code. For stability it war-
rants a condition on the parameters such that φb + xβh < 1. This is an important
assumption within the model, as high progressivity coupled with rising top income
share would imply a larger windfall rise in disposable income due to a tax break
that primarily benefit lower income households who are a larger percentage of the
population, and lower progressivity coupled with rising top income share provides a
smaller windfall. How these lower income households consume or borrow against this
windfall then determines the movement of net private savings and then the current
account.
In this model it is assumed that the lump-sum tax does not incur any costs; if
raising this amount has an adjustment cost associated with it then that will put more
weight on government borrowing as a vehicle for government financing.
2.4.4 Current Account
Since trade balance is much more intuitive and immediately interpretable as cor-
responding changes to top and bottom consumption, I define trade balance in the
model, noting that it is in fact equivalent to the current account in the context of
this model without investment:
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tb = yh −G− (xct + (1− x)cb);
Where the proportion of Households in either home or foreign country that belongs
to the defined top income percentile is x. In our calibrations, I define x = 5%.
2.4.5 Equilibrium Conditions
The following equilibrium conditions ensure a unique steady state solution for our
dynamic variables {c, b, bg}.
Goods market clearing condition:
ω(x(ch+
θ
2
(bh−bhss)2)+(1−x)cb+G)+(1−ω)(x(cfh+ θf
2
(bfh−bfhss)2)+(1−x)cfb) = ωyh+(1−ω)yf
Bond market clearing condition:
ω(xb+ (1− x)bb) + (1− ω)(xbf + (1− x)bfb) = 0
2.4.6 Shocks
Other than the trend shocks, government spending follows:
G′ = (1− ρG)Gss + ρGG+ φµgµ,tµ+ c
Without the term multiplied to φµ, government spending is not correlated to rises
in inequality, so that whenever inequality rises under a progressive tax system, fiscal
balance improves. Adding a small response of government spending to inequality, we
can get the result that fiscal balance will fall with inequality as mentioned earlier.
States for marginal Income tax of the top income share follows:
τh = τhss + a
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States for marginal Income tax of the bottom income share follows:
τl = τlss + b
2.4.7 Calibrations
With observation of the U.S. economy, I set lower income marginal tax to be constant,
and higher income tax rate varies according to a Markov process. Agents anticipate
the regime switches. The transition matrix of the Markov process is characterized by:
M =
[
0.85 0.15
0.05 0.95
]
Calibration for the rest of the parameters are:
βb, βfb Discount factors 0.96
βt, βft 0.98
ξ Population Proportion 0.05
ω 0.045 Kumhof (2015)
θ, bt,ss Asset Adjustment Cost 0.8, 0 Aguiar (2004)
θf , bft,ss 0.275, 0
σ Utility Parameters 2
γ 0 (& 8)
yh Output 1
yf 1
τssh Structure of Income tax 0.28 (& 0.396)
τssl 0.15 U.S. average
Gss, φG Fiscal Policy 0.11, 0.4
φbg 0.12 Gali (2008)
Table 2.7: Dynamic Model Calibrations
I follow mostly Aguiar et al. (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007) and Gali et al. (Gali
et al., 2012) in the calibration of country specific parameters and government fiscal
policy parameters, and since there is no previous research on consumption externali-
ties of this form in a dynamic small open economy setting, I use appropriate parameter
calibration that results in similar dynamics of the U.S. economy.
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2.4.8 Solution Methods
Looking at the data we see that marginal income tax progressivity does indeed change,
and it seems to exhibit persistence. I employ a regime-switching DSGE solution
method, where I assume that marginal income tax changes involve a Markov-switching
states of the underlying parameter; agents can incorporate expectation of differences
in marginal income tax change in their optimization behavior, and I look at what
happens to variables in the model given this assumption and a rise in inequality.
The solution method relies on works by Maih (Maih, 2014), which approximates the
stochastic response to the change in state with a third-order perturbation method.
2.4.9 Impulse Response Functions
Trend Shocks to Inequality and Output Growth
Without the externality, under the calibrations and the model setting, a cumulative
2% rise in inequality at the top has the effect of increasing consumption and savings
of the rich, while the poor will consume and save less. Due to the difference in
discount rate between the rich and the poor (poor are more impatient), and the fact
that the income of the poor is already low, the drop in consumption of the poor do
not offset that of the rise in the rich, and the immediate response is a drop in the
current account. Thus a more progressive marginal income tax regime means that
inequality shock has less of an effect on decreasing the disposable income of the poor,
their demand for assets increase is lower, hence the drop in current account is smaller.
Accumulating the inequality trend yields the same results. Fiscal deficit rises as well
under inequality, due to the response of government spending to rises in top income
shares.
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Figure 2·9: IRF: Inequality Shock Only
The model mechanics are slightly different from the one I discussed, and can be
illustrated better using a simple graph. Within the model, rich domestic households
are suppliers of assets and the poor households are demanders. Depending on foreign
income and preferences, there is some interest rate that clears the international asset
market in the aggregate. A rise in inequality makes the rich want to supply more
assets, while the poor in this model are also inter-temporal consumption smoothers,
so although their income goes down and therefore consumption goes down, they also
demand more borrowing. The combined affect is that now current account position
worsens. With a more progressive income system in place, we have to take into
consideration income effects. The poor’s income is larger now that income tax system
is more progressive, because within the model more progressivity along rises in income
implies a bigger tax break to the poor. Their best course of action from this point
is to have consumption rise a bit in their windfall rise in disposable income, and to
borrow less. So current account position still worsens along a rise in inequality, but
not as much as a case with less progressive marginal income tax rate.
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Figure 2·10: Supply and Demand of Foreign Funds
With a rising top income share, and more patient rich households than poor households,
the rich consume and save more, while the poor consume less and borrow more. With the
consumption externality, another motive for the poor households is to close the consumption
gap between them and the rich, so their borrowing rate is even more out of their disposable
income.
Although intuitive, the direction of change in current account with rising inequal-
ity and increasing marginal income tax progressivity is at odds with the empirical
findings. Perhaps we can correct the results by adding a growth trend. Growth of
cumulative 2% causes both the rich to be willing to consume even more while the
poor also become more willing consumers. The poor actually consumes even more
out of their increases in disposable income, so the gap between the impulse response
of the two income tax regimes closes.
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Figure 2·11: IRF: Growth Shock Only
However, the ordering is not changed. Inequality still impacts the income of the
two households the same, so while shifting consumption pattern of the poor, the rich
is also shifted.
Consumption Externality
I now introduce consumption externality as an additional feature of the model. With-
out a consumption externality, inequality will prompt the poor to improve their asset
position whenever there is a windfall rise in disposable income through a tax break.
This results in improvements of the trade balance, all the while government borrowing
and therefore government debt increases. With consumption externalities, the poor,
instead of decreasing their consumption, will ironically increase their consumption
to close the gap between their consumption and that of the rich. With higher tax
progressivity, they increase their consumption further by consuming all the windfall,
leading to a greater dip in trade balances. I assume that consumption externality
changes the Euler equation for low income households:
eq = βb
c′b
cb
−σ ch
c′h
γ(1−σ)
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Due to the fact that the poor react to an increase in inequality by increasing their
borrowing to close the consumption gap whenever possible, and at first in a drastic
manner, trade balance dips and recovers in the long run. As long as poor households
are initially borrowers, and the effect of externality is large enough, rising marginal
income tax to the rich acts as a tax break to the poor, and they borrow even more
in response to this rise in disposable income.
Given the same shock to inequality, by increasing the differential in the amount
of income tax paid out and thus changing the marginal rate of tax, we can see that
the response is a larger increase in consumption of the poor, as well as the rich. As
a result, the trade balance response is that immediately after the inequality shock, it
dips down even further.
Figure 2·12: IRF: Inequality Shocks with Externality
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Figure 2·13: Externality and Demand for External Funds
Given a level of rich consumption, decrease in income share of the poor always means less
consumption for them. But the consumption externality makes consumption of the two
types of households interdependent. A rise in income share of the rich prompts them to
consume more, which makes the poor consume more. A more progressive income tax system
under this type of interdependent preferences and rise in inequality could mean even higher
consumption of the poor, and together, a larger current account deficit.
In summary, we can see that with higher income tax progressivity and adding
consumption externality, due to the same trend inequality shock the increase in con-
sumption of the rich is lower while the increase in consumption of the poor is higher.
The consumption differences settle in the long run, but in the short run, a greater
marginal income tax progressivity spells out a higher negative trade balance.
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Figure 2·14: Supply and Demand for External Funds with Externality
Illustration of a rise in marginal income tax progressivity along rising top income shares:
More progressive taxes in the model is effectively transferring disposable income from the
rich to the poor. As long as the poor are borrowers, and the decline in consumption of
the rich is small enough, effect of externality dominates and the poor reacts to this rise in
disposable income by borrowing even more in volume. Without the externality, the poor
reacts to the rise in disposable income by borrowing less today.
Government Policies
I now examine changes in government spending. A 1% increase in government spend-
ing leads to a higher government deficit, so price of government bond goes down. This
crowds out private investment of the rich and price of bonds go up, making the value
of the borrowing of the poor higher. They will response thus by increasing consump-
tion on the perceived increase in income, and increase their assets. But the increase
in government spending, therefore decrease in bond supply of the rich is not exactly
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offset by the poor households’ increase in assets, and as a result the current account
balance increases. Since government spending has gone down, trade balance is also
going down. Government spending increase also increases taxes that are raised in
lump-sum, which decreases consumption of households as well as savings, so current
account drops further.
Figure 2·15: IRF: Government Spending
2.4.10 Simulated Model Moments
I simulate the model for 500 periods with trending inequality shocks and output
shocks, where trends to inequality fluctuates by 1%, while growth fluctuates around
0.5%. Government spending is also shocked with 0.5% around the steady state. I
also allow for progressivity of marginal income tax to switch according to the markov
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process. I then take the simulated data, use a HP filter to separate the trend and
cyclical component of the appropriate variables. Looking at correlations of the fil-
tered data, consumption of the rich is negatively correlated with current account and
positively correlated with government deficit. Under a growth shock, both current
account and fiscal account improves. Inequality on the other hand increases current
account deficit while improving fiscal account deficit when the income tax system
is more progressive. Overall, the first force dominates, giving a positive correlation
between current account and fiscal account. Government spending also decreases the
current account as well as the fiscal balance. In the model, under high progressivity,
tax break is larger for the poor households. They spend most of it, putting even more
downward pressure on the current account, while for high progressivity budget bal-
ance improves. Therefore the correlation between current account and fiscal balance
declines in the high progressivity regime.
Most important observation is the strengthened negative correlation between cur-
rent account and consumption of the bottom shares, when progressivity rises. This
follows directly from the fact that the same amount of rise in inequality under a more
progressivity regime allows for a higher tax break to these low income households,
for which they spend most of it in increasing consumption, bringing down current
account balance.
In the model, growth shocks increase consumption and improve budget balance,
while spending shocks reduce consumption as well as budget balance. Inequality on
the other hand increases consumption and reduces the budget balance. Empirically we
observe a negative correlation between consumption and budget balance, but within
the model, that correlation is positive, which is a failure of the model.
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Data Low Progressivity High Progressivity
ρca,bgh 0.128 0.51 0.25
ρca,c -0.372
ρca,ch -0.38 -0.43
ρca,cb -0.28 -0.54
ρc,bgh -0.312
ρch,bgh 0.36 0.45
ρcb,bgh 0.45 0.53
ρch,cb 0.41 0.50
Table 2.8: Simulation: Progressivity Regimes
2.4.11 Tax Cuts to the Top and Bottom
The above assumed that marginal income tax progressivity is guided by changes in
the top marginal income rate only. I now look instead at what happens to the current
account and the fiscal deficit when marginal income tax progressivity changes due to
a tax cut applied either to the top or to the bottom. Particularly, I assume three
states, one where no cut has occurred with the top paying 36% on their income and
the bottom paying 10% on their income. Then either a top tax cut of 11% could
occur, or a bottom cut of 5% could occur2 . In the perspective of households, if they
are in a regime where no tax cut is applied to them, they expect with probability
0.05 a tax cut is applied next period, while in a regime where a tax cut is applied to
them, there is a probability of 0.15 that they will go back to the regime where no tax
cut occurs. These are the only scenarios that they expect. The transition matrix can
thus be characterized by:
M =
 0.85 0.15 00.05 0.95 0.05
0 0.15 0.85

2So income tax rate on the rich could be cut by 30%, while the income tax rate on the poor could
be cut by 50%.
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Figure 2·16: IRF: Inequality Shocks and Tax Cuts
In the figure, we can see in regime 2 for which a top tax cut of 11% has occurred
there is a strong improvement on the current account, while fiscal deficit is still
increasing but less. In regime 3 where a bottom cut of 5% occurred, rising inequality
improves the current account but initially tax revenue increased so much that fiscal
balance improves at first from the original position. Due to the fact that the poor in
this model are more avid consumers because of their subjection to the consumption
externality, improvements to the current account from cut to the bottom in the face
of inequality is not as effective as a cut to the top.
As for the fiscal account, under a top tax cut there is a large decline in tax revenue,
so as inequality rises and government spending increases, fiscal deficit increases from
the no tax cut scenario. While under a bottom tax cut, as inequality rises tax revenue
does not drop as much and fiscal revenue improves. In summary, a larger budget
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deficit is correlated with a smaller fall in the current account, and vice versa.
Figure 2·17: Re-accumulated IRFs: Inequality Shocks and Tax Cuts
The table shows simulated correlations between the current account, consumptions
and government deficit. The only shock is the 2% cumulative trend shock occurring to
top income shares, to isolate its effects. We see that under inequality shocks, current
account and budget deficit correlation will depend on where the tax cut has occurred.
The positive correlation comes out of a top cut. Rising inequality gives rise to a
decline in current account, and as government spending increases fiscal balance falls;
the tax cut occurring at the top means raising tax revenue is that much harder. While
a bottom cut means the poor are somewhat more responsive to a rise in inequality,
as seen from the coefficient of current account on low income consumption. A cut
to the bottom, however, does not have that much of an impact on tax revenue as
inequality is rising. Government spending rises with inequality, but the rise is not
enough to overcome the improving affect of rising tax revenue on fiscal balance due
to progressivity of the tax system under the bottom tax cut, and we have a falling
current account, but a marginally improving fiscal account.
For just inequality shocks, the correlation between top and bottom consumption
isn’t that strong. The inequality force dictates that consumption of the two type of
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households go in different directions, while the consumption externality push them
in the same direction. In the top cut case, despite trying to catch up with the rich,
when inequality rises we still have consumption of the rich escaping that of the rise
of the poor, hence the slight negative correlation in the last row for consumption of
the rich versus the poor in the top cut case.
Top Cut(Less Progressive) Bottom Cut (More Progressive)
ρca,bgh 0.16 -0.09
ρca,ch -0.62 -0.63
ρca,cb -0.09 -0.21
ρch,bgh -0.42 -0.09
ρcb,bgh 0.90 0.98
ρch,cb -0.01 0.03
Table 2.9: Simulation: Tax Cuts
From the current United States tax system, if we are to expect the persistent rise
in inequality that we have observed in the past decades, specific tax cuts that change
the marginal progressivity of our income tax system will have different implications
for current account and fiscal deficits. While current account will improve with either
tax cuts along the inequality trend (larger improvement comes from a top tax cut), A
tax cut to the top worsens the fiscal situation while tax cut to the bottom will have
less of an impact on the fiscal balance.
2.5 Chapter Summary
To summarize key results in the paper, empirically I find an unconditional relationship
between top income inequality and the current account, but only in the long-run.
I go one step further and find that conditional on a median marginal income tax
progression, a 1% increase in top 5% income share is associated with a 0.2% drop in
the current account among OECD countries in the long run, while a one standard
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deviation increase in the marginal income tax progressivity adds an additional -0.2%
to the relationship between top 5% income share to the current account. To provide an
explanation, I propose that marginal income taxation is very important in determining
the disposable income of households, and based on preferences of the households for
consumption and saving, highly progressive marginal income tax systems give rise to
lower current account balance when inequality rises.
The main intuition of the paper is that high levels of progressivity combined
with rising inequality implies an increase in government tax revenue, and as long
as government is transferring some of the tax revenue, or giving a larger tax break
to lower income households who borrows an increasingly larger proportion of their
disposable income, current account declines. Depending on government fiscal policies
on income taxation, rising inequality might cause current account and fiscal deficits
to move in the same or opposite directions.
I then build a dynamic two-country general equilibrium model and calibrate to
the U.S. economy. Within the model, a cumulative 2% increase in top 5% income
share constitutes a 1.3% drop in the current account under the current income tax
progressivity regime; 11% increase in top 5% marginal income tax rate adds a further
0.2% drop in current account when top income share grows by the same amount.
Along rises in inequality, fiscal deficit is negatively correlated with the current account
and positively correlated with the consumption of the rich. Then upon examining the
effects of different tax cuts, I find that a tax cut of 11% to the top of the distribution
when inequality is rising has the consequence of reducing the fall in the current
account, but worsens the fiscal position, while a 5% cut in income taxes to the bottom
of the distribution does little for the current account position, but since this increases
the progressivity of the marginal income tax, the fiscal position actually improves at
first. In the classical view of twin deficit hypothesis, a tax cut fuels a consumption
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boom which gives rise to current account shortfalls; here, I add to the discussion by
saying who gets the tax cut also matters.
This paper gives some interesting policy implications. Often, when a nation is fac-
ing domestic recessions, a tax cut could stimulate economic recovery. Many nations
nowadays also face a problem of rising inequality. These forces combine to give impor-
tant implications about the budget deficit and the current account. When inequality
is rising, a tax cut to the top decreases marginal income tax rate progressivity, so
tax revenue rises more slowly and budget deficit problem is more severe. However,
less of a windfall rise in income is attributed to the poor who are thrift spenders,
and so improving the current account problem along rises in inequality. A tax cut to
the bottom increases progressivity of the tax, so as inequality rises the budget deficit
problem is improved; however, the poor will likely spend the windfall for various rea-
sons and save less on it so the current account position would not improve as much as
if the tax cut is at the top. There are many more macroeconomic forces at work, but
at least in the face of a trend increase in the income of the top, a tax cut to the top
will certainly have a larger negative impact on the fiscal balance, while the current
account might improve a bit more, as opposed to a tax cut applied to the bottom.
Of course, despite less effectiveness of the bottom tax cut in improving the current
along rises in inequality, it has the added benefit of not worsening the budget deficit
from whatever the starting government budget balance may be, but a tax cut to the
top is not completely without it merits. If the government of a nation is worried about
a persistent and worsening current account position, a tax cut to the top might be a
more viable option to combat the imbalance. What constitutes a worrisome current
account balance, and when exact should the fiscal authority start to worry about
current account deficits is not answered in this paper, and left to future research.
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Chapter 3
Defaultable Sovereign Bonds, Income
Inequality and Fiscal Policy
One motivation for the accumulation of sovereign debt is to combat inequality. Na-
tional borrowing is an easy way to raise cashflow of the government to support transfer
and spending programs. This is evidenced empirically, where nations with higher in-
dices of inequality are also countries that pose a higher default risk. This leads to the
question of what motivates the sovereign government to default on its bonds? On the
one hand, sovereign default carries it’s repercussions, usually plunging the country
into a recession and making the government face a much higher cost of borrowing in
the years immediately following the default. On the other hand, the nation might be
facing too much hardship in raising taxes that prevent them from rationally justifying
the repayment of its sovereign bonds.
In this paper, I add to a canonical sovereign bond model income inequality, thus
putting the distribution of income at the center of the motivation for sovereign de-
fault. Furthermore, other than the nation’s policy for borrowing and default, I also
tract their behavior of raising income taxes, particularly on the rich, to both combat
inequality, as well as to pay off it’s debts. However, changing the nation’s tax code
towards a more progressive system carries increasing costs to the nation, so there is
an optimal trade-off between a nation’s sovereign bond default policy and income tax
policy, which is the subject of discussion henceforth.
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3.1 Latin American Sovereign Debt Crisis of the 1980s
The topic of this paper is best illustrated by the Latin American sovereign debt crisis
of the 1980s. Beginning in the late 1970s through the 1980s, many Latin American
countries experiencing rapid economic growth in the previous decade encountered
sudden and violent sovereign crisis episodes that eventually led to varying degrees of
default. Economic growth and optimism in the early 1970s led to large amounts of
foreign investment pouring into the country, and the Latin American governments
became increasingly careless in their fiscal policies, borrowing money from private
banks all over the world to investing in large infrastructural projects, setting goals to
eliminate poverty and taking on an unsustainable amount of debt.
Throughout this period of growth and optimism, inequality remained. When the
oil crisis sent the global economy into recession, and growing worries of crisis mounted,
those lending suddenly came to a halt. Partly due to the social unrest as a result,
and partly due to the eventual slow down of growth due to unproductive investments,
market uncertainty to set in, and first country to go bankrupt was Mexico. This led to
mounting unease about investment prospects in Mexico and the larger Latin American
economy, with international investors pulling their funds. As economic growth slowed,
governments across Latin America felt the squeeze between disappearing tax revenue,
and the growing needs for spending and social welfare payments. The cascading effect
eventually toppled the national debt of Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and Argentina.
There is also an interesting legal aspect to the Latin American sovereign default
crisis. Many of the Latin American nations, to instill confidence and to negotiate a
smaller discount on their sovereign bond, usually issued their bonds under the foreign
currency, within the legal jurisdiction of the country of these international investors.
Argentina, for example, issued 90% of their bonds from 1981 to 1987 under U.S.
jurisdiction to large American investors. At the point of default, many investors was
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content with the renegotiated debt and payment scheme, as any recovery of their
investment was welcome. But investors protected by the U.S. financial courts held
out and use collective bargaining clauses to their advantage to delay a settlement, to
engage in a length legal battle to ensure maximum recovery of investment. Some of the
worthless bonds were even bought by “vulture” investment companies in anticipation
of the Argentinian default, who belief in their legal expertise in coercing a settlement
better than the wholesale price just prior to the default. The legal aspect of the
Latin American sovereign bonds definitely played an important role in determining
the severity of the crisis, the length of the crisis, as well as the speed of recovery after
the crisis.
From the above discussions, it is clear that there is an intricate interaction between
economic growth, income inequality and government spending and taxation behavior,
permissible by the legal framework, that ultimately determines the amount of debt
a nation could undertake, and at what point the nation would optimally default. In
the next section of this paper, we first empirically examine how rising inequality in
income, government spending and taxation contributes or alleviates the probability
of default. Then, using a sovereign default model, we examine the optimal decision of
a sovereign government to default under shocks to income inequality and government
spending. To begin, we examine the literature on sovereign default in recent history.
3.2 Literature Review
The Sovereign default literature began with the seminal paper by Eaton and Gerso-
vitz (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), who examined optimal debt accumulation under no
commitment. Arellano (Arellano, 2008) takes a discrete time version of the model to
study the circumstances that lead to the Argentinian sovereign default episode of the
early 2000s. Aguiar and Gopinath (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007) uses the Arellano
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framework to further examine differences between permanent and temporary shocks
of the nations’ output on the speed of debt accumulation and on the probability of
default. After Arellano, sovereign default literature went on various directions to
include the effects of news shocks on default, the effect of a CDS market on default,
the effect of independent monetary policy on default, even the effect of a democratic
political system of the probability of default. From a historical perspective, Reinhart
and Rogoff (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) documented almost eight centuries of gov-
ernment debt and default patterns all over the world. They find strikingly similar
economic patterns before the default, and very similar durations of crisis episodes
before the crisis is eventually resolved.
More recently, Jeon and Kabukcuoglu (Jeon and Kabukcuoglu, 2014) adds in the
canonical sovereign default model inequality shocks, and found that rising inequality
in income leads to higher sovereign debt and default probability. While Jeon and
Kabukcuoglu’s model has two types of agents, one rich and one old, Ferriere (Ferriere,
2016) uses an infinite agent model to study the same phenomenon. In her paper, she
also examines the effectiveness of a linear progressive income tax system at improving
social welfare and therefore reducing the probability of default.
This paper follows the above line of research. In my framework, inequality follow
the exogenous process as in Jeon and Kabukcuoglu. Instead of looking at a linear
progressive income tax, I examine a situation where raising taxes on the top income
households is increasingly costly in terms of resources. This introduces a trade-off
between raising taxes to finance government spending and transfers versus raising
debt to fulfill the same spending obligations and transfer decisions, while can be
shown to be the forces behind the sovereign default episodes for many countries in
the early 1980s Latin America.
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Logit Model
In this section, I use the Logit model on the probability of first encountering de-
fault data. I Include the Gini index, and add Debt/GDP ratio, Government Spend-
ing/GDP ratio and Tax revenue/GDP ratio data. The years of observation span
from 1981 to 2004. The table below lists the name of the countries in our sample.
Each country in the lower middle income country has experienced at least one default
episode in the two decade period.
The choice of the logit probabilistic function is made due to the dichotomous
nature of the independent default variable, as well as the rare natural of a default.
Despite the troubles Latin American countries experienced in the 1980s, these nations
eventually climbed out of their troubled times in the 1990s and began to recover.
(1) (2) (3)
CATEGORY Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income High Income
Bolivia Argentina Chile
El Salvador Bolivia Uruguay
Guyana Brazil
Honduras Colombia
Paraguay Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Table 3.1: Latin American Country by Income Level
The logit model in which I estimate is:
Pr{Di = 1} = Φ(β0 + β1Giniit + β1govern′tspendingit + β2taxit +XB) + it
Where i stands for country and t stands for year. XB includes year and income
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group dummies defined by the UN. Additionally, the equation includes real GDP per
capita, and Debt to GDP ratio of a country.
The table below are the logit model estimates with robust standard errors. From
the model, Raising the one year lagged values of the Gini index increases the prob-
ability of default, while raising the one year lagged value of government spending
decreases the probability of default. Larger debt to GDP ratio in the previous period
increases the default probability, while raising the per capita GDP in the previous
period seems to decreases the default probability somewhat, although the effect is
not significant.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES default default default
L.Gini 0.0366 0.184*** 0.176**
(0.0488) (0.0683) (0.0866)
L.gspending -39.94*** -55.29***
(10.85) (14.63)
L.tax 16.95
(11.61)
L.debtgdp 0.0721*** 0.110*** 0.113***
(0.0138) (0.0206) (0.0260)
L.rgdpl -3.07e-05 9.17e-05 -8.30e-07
(0.000117) (0.000145) (0.000167)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Income Group Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant -5.439* -16.24*** -13.20**
(3.293) (6.097) (5.331)
Observations 197 191 146
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.2: Logit Model Regression Coefficients
The next table reports the marginal effects of a one unit increase in the indepen-
dent variable on the outcome variable.
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES y1 y1
L.Gini 0.0276** 0.0111
(0.0116) (0.00727)
L.debtgdp 0.0280*** 0.00938**
(0.00690) (0.00380)
L.rgdpl 0.000137** 4.73e-05
(6.42e-05) (3.00e-05)
L.gspending -0.0676* -0.0468**
(0.0364) (0.0205)
L.tax 0.0257*
(0.0143)
Observations 198 146
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: Logit Model Marginal Effects (dy/dx)
3.3.2 Margins Plots
Marginal plots provide better picture of the various contributions of the independent
variables on default. Examining the probability of default for countries in the different
country categories defined by the UN, it is clear that most of the default occurred
in lower middle income countries, and some for the upper middle income country
groups, notably Argentina.
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Figure 3·1: Default Probability and Income Level
Predicted probability of default given which income group countries are in, 1985 - 2005
As is the case with the marginal effects coefficient estimation, we see that the one
year lagged debt to GDP ratio, Gini and tax revenue as a percentage of GDP all
increases default probability, while the government spending to GDP ratio decreases
the probability of default.
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Figure 3·2: Default Probability, Debt and Gini
On the left, average probability of default given the debt to GDP ratio. On the right, average
probability of default given the Gini coefficient. Countries are divided into 3 income group
categories according to the UN definition.
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Figure 3·3: Default Probability, Government Tax and Spending
On the left, average probability of default given the one year lag of tax revenue. On the
right, average probability of default given government spending.
Having a one period lag of the variables suffers from missing the dynamic aspect
of how these variables interact with each other. We next use these models and build
a panel VAR model to further look at the variables respond to the impulses of raising
Gini, government spending and tax revenues.
A Linear Probability Model
To simplify the analysis, we enter default in to the VAR model linearly. Adding gov-
ernment spending, we see that although government spending decreases the propen-
sity to default in the period immediately following the impulse, it eventually leads to
raised probability of default in the longer horizon.
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Figure 3·4: Panel VAR, Default Probability and Covariates
Panel VAR impulse response plots, with no tax revenue to GDP ratio.
Using a panel VAR method applied to the latin American Countries from a period
of 1985 to 2000, and assuming a linear probability model, we see that unsurprisingly a
rise of debt to GDP ratio increases the probability of default. Real GDP decreases the
probability somewhat, but the relationship is not very precise. Government spending
decreases the probability of default, with a rise in the Gini index increases gives a
large spike to the probability of default in the periods immediately following. On the
other hand, default tends to suppress real GDP in the 5 year window following the
default, and tends to decrease the Gini coefficient somewhat in the period following
the default.
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Figure 3·5: Panel VAR, Default, Government Spending and Tax
Panel VAR impulse response plots, with tax revenue to GDP ratio.
In the graph above, I include tax revenue collection (per capita) data in the same
panel VAR model. Most substantial results remain, while a rise in tax revenues in
addition increases the probability of default.
3.3.3 Country Graphs
Economic Decline, Rising inequality, and rising government spending are all culprits
that lead to the sovereign debt crisis in Argentina, while the ability for the government
to collect higher tax revenues seems to be a key mechanism that determines default,
and one that determines whether the country was able to come out of the crisis.
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Figure 3·6: Argentina Debt, Gini and Default, 1970 -2005
Argentina debt to GDP ratio, government spending and tax revenue, GDP per capita and
Gini coefficient, 1970 - 2005. The grey region are period of sovereign default crisis, as
defined by Reinhart and Rogoff.
In summary, Rising inequality in income raises the probability of default, and
although increases in government spending leads to lowering default probability in
the immediate period after the increase, in the long-run it leads to larger default
proabilities. If more general tax revenue is raised within the country for a given
period, default probability decreases.
3.4 Model
3.4.1 Description
In the previous section, we can see that government spending on programs seems
to exhibit tradeoffs between spending and default. While rising Gini coefficient has
large increasing effect on the probability of default, government spending decreases
default probability. Increases in government spending in term requires larger revenue
tax collection to finance, or else the probability of default might increase.
I build a sovereign default model and calibrate it to the Argentina Economy, and
explain the co-movements of government spending, tax revenue and inequality and
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the debt to GDP ratio. The dynamic optimization behavior of a sovereign government
in this model can be categorized as:
max ξUh + (1− ξ)Ub
s.t.
y = ξch + (1− ξ)cb + g
as well as the following constraints in Good Credit:
ch =
µ(1− τ − τh)
ξ
y
cb =
(1− µ)(1− τ)
1− ξ y −
T
1− ξ
T = (τ + ξτh)y − g − κ(τh + τ)
[
(τh − τ ′h)2 + (τh − τ ′h)
]
+ (qB′ −B)
whereas under bad credit, the constraints become:
ch =
µ(1− τ − τh)
ξ
yd
cb =
(1− µ)(1− τ)
1− ξ yd −
T
1− ξ
T = (τ + ξτh)yd − gd − κ(τh + τ)
[
(τh − τ ′h)2 + (τh − τ ′h)
]
The social planner chooses the optimal next period tax rate to the rich, and the
sovereign bonds, given this periods state. Bond is defaultable, so every period, given
the value of default and no default, the choice between default and no default is made.
Default Cost is such that gd > g, where gd is a quadratic function of g, and also the
country is excluded from international bond market for θ periods. Inequality µ has
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15 states, while output/government spending follows an AR(1) process.
An important point to note is the fact that tax adjustment cost is quadratic,
and the cost actually is lower when income tax progressiveness adjust downwards.
This feature is important in generating a difference in default rate for the same
level of inequality given the progressivity of tax code. This tension between a desire
to revert back to lower tax progressivity system and lower inequality gives rise to
differing default decisions. It is certainly plausible that in a voting system where
voting power is at least somewhat attributed to wealth, the rich would have more
say in lowering the tax applied exclusively to them, so adjusting the tax upwards
faces more intangible cost, while it is much easier, and potential cost saving to adjust
income tax progressivity downwards.
3.4.2 International Investors
International Investors are risk neutral, and maximize their profit from investments,
with a risk-less option r. The price of discount sovereign bond is:
q =
E(1− d)
1 + r
where E(1− d) is the expected probability of default of the sovereign bond.
3.4.3 Planner’s Problem
W = max {Wd=0(τh, B, g),Wd=1(τh, g}
Where Wd=0 is defined as:
Wd=0 = max
τ ′,B′
ξu(ct) + (1− ξ)u(cb) + βEW (τ ′, B′, g)
s.t.
ch =
µ(1− τ − τh)
ξ
y
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cb =
(1− µ)(1− τ)
1− ξ y −
T
1− ξ
T = (τ + ξτh)y − g − κ(τh + τ)
[
(τh − τ ′h)2 + (τh − τ ′h)
]
+ (qB′ −B)
In default, debt existing is not paid back, but economy suffers a TFP decrease in
autarky and with probability θ remains in autarky next period, and with probability
θ comes out of autarky with all debts forgiven:
Wd=1 = ξu(ch) + (1− ξ)u(cb) + βE{θWd=0(τ ′, 0, g) + (1− θ)Wd=1(τ ′, g)}
s.t.
ch =
µ(1− τ − τh)
ξ
yd
cb =
(1− µ)(1− τ)
1− ξ yd −
T
1− ξ
T = (τ + ξτh)yd − gd − κ(τh + τ)
[
(τh − τ ′h)2 + (τh − τ ′h)
]
3.4.4 Calibration and Solution Methods
The solution is found by a grid search algorithm, used in Arellano(2008). Similar to
the literature, there are two loops: the bond choice loop and price loop. For a given
bond price, and given all level of existing bond and tax progressivity, the optimal
bond choice and tax progressivity is given for next period. Then, new prices given
the bond, tax and default choice are computed. The process iterates until we find a
fixed point where the bond choice and price stabilizes.
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β Discount factor 0.85
θ Probability of remaining in autarky 0.3
σ CRRA preference parameter 2
r Risk-free interest rate 0.02
κ Asset Adjustment Cost 2
κd 3
τ Tax on income paid by the poor households 0.15
ξ proportion of population in the rich category 0.05
y National Income 1
yd 0.05
g Government Spending 0.21
gd 0.02
µ Median income inequality 0.6
Table 3.4: Sovereign Default Model Calibrations
3.5 Shocks to Inequality
3.5.1 Default Regions
Defaults are more likely when more debt is held. Given the same level of debt,
when inequality is higher the probability of default is higher. In addition, when tax
progressivity is higher, the probability of default is lower; this highlight the main
result of the paper, that the trade-off exists between government raising of debt and
raising progressive tax revenue for the purpose of meeting government spending and
welfare maximizing transfers.
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Figure 3·7: Default Region Representation
3-D visualization of the regions of default. Each dot represents a combination of transfers,
government spending and level of debt outstanding that gives way to optimal default. The
first x-axis is the level of debt outstanding. The second x-axis represents the amount of
inequality in income, and the y-axis represents how progressive the income tax system is.
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3.5.2 Default Regions: Income Inequality and Debt
Figure 3·8: Default Region and Top Income Share
Default region for the levels of debt and inequality. More debt outstanding, as inequality
rises, default becomes more likely. Default region shrinks as progressivity of the income tax
system increases.
The figure above shows default regions given the level of debt and inequality, for
different levels of tax progressivity, starting from top to bottom low income tax pro-
gressivity to high. A prominent feature is that as inequality reduces, the region of
default for a given level of debt reduces. As tax becomes more progressive, the region
shrinks as well.
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3.5.3 Default Regions: Tax Progressivity and Debt
Figure 3·9: Default Region and Tax Progressivity
Default region for the levels of debt and tax progressivity. More debt outstanding, as
progressivity of tax rises, default becomes less likely. Default region increases as inequality
in income increases.
Changing tax progressiveness carries in itself costs to the amount of transfers, with
already higher tax progressiveness carry more cost when changing the tax code. We
see that as inequality increases, the default region generally decreases. At higher
levels of already high income tax progressivity, a higher level of tax progressivity.
Never the less, for higher tax progressivity, default probability is less for a certain
level of sovereign debt held.
3.5.4 Bond Price Schedule
Price of the bond quickly drops to zero as default on the bond becomes a certainty.
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Figure 3·10: Sovereign Bond Price Schedule
Bond price schedule given the level of debt. Bond price is equal to the inverse of the discount
rate for low levels of debt and probability of default is zero, but quickly drops to zero as
debt rises and default is imminent.
3.5.5 Yield Curve
For low levels of inequality, the yield curve shifts to the left, and becomes increasingly
higher, until all the debt is defaulted upon.
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Figure 3·11: Sovereign Bond Yield Curve
Yield curve given the level of debt. Yield on sovereign bond increases as price remains the
same and the amount of lending increases on the part of risk-neutral international investors,
but quickly drops to zero as debt rises and default is imminent.
3.6 Shocks to Inequality and Government Spending
Use Multi-variate Tauchen method (Karibzhanov, 2013). There is a dimensionality
problem, where dealing with 5 state variables (3 stochastic states and 2 endogenous
states) might limit the precision of the simulation exercise.
82
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.55
0.6
0.65
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.55
0.6
0.65
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.55
0.6
0.65
Figure 3·12: Default and Top Income Share, Fixed Spending and Tax
Default region for the levels of debt and tax progressivity. More debt outstanding, as
progressivity of tax rises, default becomes less likely. Default region increases as inequality
in income increases. Government spending is held constant.
Default region for Inequality (distribution of income to the top) versus debt, hold-
ing progressivity of the income tax and government spending constant (increasing
income tax progressivity from top to bottom).
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Figure 3·13: Default and Tax, Fixed Spending and Inequality
Default region for the levels of debt and inequality. More debt outstanding, as inequality
rises, default becomes more likely. Default region shrinks as progressivity of the income tax
system increases. Government spending is held constant.
Default region for income tax progressivity and debt, holding top income shares
and government spending constant (increase inequality from top to bottom). Gov-
ernment is very sensitive to the changes in the level of progressive tax that can be
raised, as evidenced by the sharp slope of the edge of the default region. This is due
to the quadratic cost of raising tax progressivity on resources.
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Figure 3·14: Default and Spending, Fixed Inequality and Tax
Default region for the levels of debt and inequality. More debt outstanding, as inequality
rises, default becomes more likely. Default region rises as government spending increases.
Revenue raised from progressive income taxation is held constant.
Default region for income government spending and debt, holding top income
shares and progressivity of income taxes constant (increase inequality from top to
bottom). As inequality rises from top panel to towards the bottom, default proba-
bility increases, as the sovereign becomes more willing to trade not paying the debt
outstanding so as to raise in current period transfers for the cost of a random extended
period of decrease in national income and exclusion from international borrowing.
3.7 Simulations
Simulation involves calibrating to the frequency of default for Argentina, and the
associated government and inequality data. Simulation should yield similar patterns
of government spending and taxation in accordance of rises in income inequality
observed in the data.
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3.7.1 Simulations without Government Spending
Parameter Argentinian Data Model Estimate
σy 4.08 0.0837
σr 3.17 0.0
σca 1.36 0.0009
σc 1.19 0.0828
ρy,r -0.59 0.0012
ρy,ca -0.89 0.9971
ρy,c 0.96 1.0000
ρca,r 0.0013
ρy,y 0.4528
Default Prob 0.075 0.023
Mean Debt to Output 19
Table 3.5: Simulation: Sovereign Debt and Inequality
3.7.2 Simulations with Government Spending
Parameter Argentinian Data Model Estimate
σy 4.08 0.0837
σr 3.17 0.0
σca 1.36 0.0009
σc 1.19 0.0828
ρy,r -0.59 0.0012
ρy,ca -0.89 0.9971
ρy,c 0.96 1.0000
ρca,r 0.0013
ρy,y 0.4528
Default Prob 0.075 0.023
Mean Debt to Output 19
Table 3.6: Simulation: Debt and Inequality with Spending Shocks
Simulation reveals that serious work needs to be done. The model is not able to gener-
ate the negative correlation between output and the interest rate, and the relationship
between output, government spending and tax revenue.
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3.8 Chapter Summary
When examining the circumstances that lead to the sovereign default decision of a na-
tion, one cannot discuss the topic without consideration of the broader socio-economic
environment of the country. In this paper, I examine the particular question of how
does the experience of income inequality influences a nations decision to default. This
idea is evidenced in the latin American default crisis episodes of the 1980s, where cer-
tainly the experience of inequality, and how it led to the patterns of spending and
taxation conducted by the government had an important role in determining the
accumulation of debt, as well as the ultimate decision to default on the debt.
Empirically, increases in Gini of the previous period by one point produces large
increases in the probability of default on average for Latin American countries in
the period between 1981 and 2004. At a first glance, government spending in the
last period tends to decreases the probability of default, while increases in taxation
somewhat increases the probability of default in the immediate following period.
Using a panel VAR framework, I further derive the fact that increases in government
spending in the 2 to 5 year horizon has significant increasing effect on the probability
of sovereign default, while tax collection significantly decreases the probability of
default in the 1 to 3 year horizon.
I then build a dynamic general equilibrium model to incorporate these findings
to study the late 1990s sovereign crisis episode of Argentina. In the model, a social
planner maximizes the social welfare of a nation in the face of income inequality and
government spending shocks by raising tax progressively as well as borrowing from
international investors. While progressive taxation bears resource costs when the
progressivity is too high, sovereign debt is non-comital and subject to default. the
optimal decision between this period’s transfers, versus the ability to borrow in the
future ultimately influences the sovereign decision on default.
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Indeed the experiences of income inequality is an important determinant of govern-
ment progressive income taxation decisions for the purpose of transfers, and together
with the amount of spendings the government needs to conduct, determines the abil-
ity and willingness for the government to honor its sovereign debt payments. There
are two ways ahead in terms of future research. First, the political environment of
the nation is important; as inequality rises and pressure on the government budget
mounts, whether the political system is democratic and follows a majority vote sys-
tem on the decision to default is important for the determination of default. Secondly,
as mentioned before the legal jurisdiction where the debt is under-written played an
important role in how the sovereign default decision played out. Sovereign debt juris-
diction and the subsequent assignment of bargaining power need to be added to the
model to further enrich the model for a better understanding of what really happened
that lead to the patterns of default observed in Latin America in the 1980s.
88
Chapter 4
Household Debt Crisis, Pecuniary
Externality and Inequality
Is the probability of a financial crisis associated with rising household debt? Such
is the assertion of recent research by Mian and Sufi (Mian and Sufi, 2014), as well
as Krugman in his 2010 talk to the Luxembourg Income Study (Krugman, 2010).
Kurgman’s address has a definite “behavioral” flavor to it, as he points the culprit
giving rise to the link between inequality and financial crisis to the middle class
families with stagnant income who imitate the rise in consumption of the extremely
wealthy. This sentiment is not shared among economists, however, as demonstrated
by a study done by Bordo and Meissner (Bordo and Meissner, 2012) on historical
data of advanced countries who finds a lack of such empirical relationship.
Previous literature has provided theoretical background linking income inequality
to rising household debt (Iacoviello, 2008); this paper adds to the literature, by
assuming rising household debt is related to rising risk of financial crisis as in the
case of Kumhoff et. al., and look instead at a closed-economy heterogeneous agent
model environment, where individual’s accumulation of debt acts as a pecuniary
externality exerted on other households that increases the price of borrowing as a
result of rising personal crisis probabilities. Poor households are borrowers, and their
default probability raises with their leverage. Once an default event occurs, a part
of their debt is erased, but they suffer a drop in income. Income process is auto-
correlated which leads to sustained low income states what leads to larger wealth
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inequality as an outcome.
4.1 Literature Review
The idea that inequality leads to crisis is an old idea, as discussed in previous chap-
ters. Only lately has the link between inequality and household debt and crisis been
recognized. Atif and Sufi (Mian and Sufi, 2014) used date to illustrate the fact that
during the housing market crisis of 2008, there is a very robust correlation between
how much debt financing a household uses and the probability they will default. Ra-
jan (Rajan, 2011) takes the argument of Atif and Sufi further, and argues that when
inequality rises, the populist political response is for the government to relax regu-
lation, or to introduce laws that allow for the extension of household credit. This
includes deregulation of mortgage monitoring and requirement for length background
checks, as well as implicit guarantees on household loans by the governing author-
ity. Rajan further asserts that this political response to inequality will give rise to
irrational exuberance, where lenders will extend an unsustainable amount of loans,
taking increasingly risky position that increases the fragility of the entire financial
system.
Iacoviello (Iacoviello, 2008) takes a long-run view on household debt and inequal-
ity. His paper is motivated by the empirical observation that inequality is closely re-
lated to household debt, and that there is an explosion of household debt post 1970s.
He explains the dynamic correlation using two forces: First, adverse income shocks to
poor income households means that they wish to borrow more in the current period
for consumption smoothing purposes, and secondly, the loosening of the household
constraint, as measured by the heavily regulated household debt to income ratio, is a
key component in explaining large increases in household debt accumulation. There
is no probability of crisis in his model, however.
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Kumhof and Ranciere (Kumhof et al., 2015) looks at the effect of inequality on
the probability of an external credit crisis. They imagine two types of households
with a nation, the rich and the poor. The rich are effectively more patient, through
their preference for physical asset. As inequality rises, rich households will consume
more and wish to save more, but because of how the utility function is specified
they will consume much more than they will save around the equilibrium, meaning
that more foreign investment is flowing into the nation as inequality rises. Through
a logarithmmic probability function, as debt to income ratio of the poor household
rises, probability of a external crisis increases under which circumstance 30% of the
poor household debt is erased. Kumhof and Raciere use this model to explain the
rise in UK current account deficit through the lens of rising inequality, and how this
contributes to the probability of a external financial crisis.
Our paper combines the ideas from a few of the above mentioned papers. Most
importantly, we also take a long run perspective as in Iacoviello, and look at household
debt accumulation as it relates to the U.S. experience of income inequality and income
shocks.
4.2 Empirical Facts
United States Statistical Facts:
1. Rise in inequality is related to the rise in probability of an economy-wide default
crisis.
2. Idiosyncratic relaxation of the borrowing constraint increases debt accumulation
of households and therefore crisis probability.
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Figure 4·1: U.S. Gini and Household Financial Obligations
On the top, United States Gini (lagged 2 years) and Household financial obligations ratio.
On the bottom, changes in household disposable income and changes in financial obligations
ratio.
I will explain these facts through the pecuniary externality externality exerted, which
widens the consumption gap between the patient rich households and impatient poor
households. In addition, I will follow the analysis by adding the non-pecuniary ex-
ternality that is introduced in chapter one, where the bottom income households will
look up to the consumption patterns of the richest household. Another important
explanation might lie in the relaxation of the borrowing constraint, either to partic-
ular households or all borrowers in general. These will also be explored in the model
section.
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Figure 4·2: Change in Gini and Financial Obligations
One year lagged difference of the Gini ratio and the difference in financial obligations ratio.
4.3 Model
A heterogeneous model of household debt; Households experience idiosyncratic in-
come shocks, and they are divided into two categories: patient versus impatient.
4.3.1 Patient Agents
There are n
N
patient agentsL
maxE0
∑
t
βt [logcit + jloghit]
s.t.
dtqt = yit + η
p
lt
dt−1 + (1− δ)hit−1 − hit − cit − φ(dit−1 − di)2
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Where ηplt is an r.v. of loss in asset coming from the impatient agents distributed
to all rich households.
ηplt =

1 0Crisis
γl1 1Crisis
γl2 2Crisis
...
γlN−n All Crisis
With γl1 ≤ γl2 ≤ ... ≤ γlN−n
First Order Condition
cit+1
cit
= βE(
ηplt
qt
)− 2φ(dit − di)
1
cit
=
j
hit
+ βEt(
1− δ
cit+1
)
Where E{ηpt } = pi0 + pi1 γltn + pi2
2γlt
n
+ ...+ pinγlt .
4.3.2 Impatient Agents
There are N−n
N
impatient agents:
maxE0
∑
t
ρt [logcit + jloghit]
s.t.
ltqt = yit + ηltlt−1 + (1− δ)hit−1 − hit − cit
as well as the borrowing constraint:
bit ≤ mtλit
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I later experiment with having the household borrowing constraint shocks be either
common to all households or idiosyncratic. Where the probability of household crisis
is defined by a logarithmic probability function:
piit =
exp(φ0 + φ1(
lt
yit−( 1qt−1 )lit
))
1 + exp(φ0 + φ1(
lt
yit−( 1qt−1 )lit
))
ηlt is γlt with probability piit, and equals 1 otherwise.
ηplt =

1 0Crisis
γl1 1Crisis
γl2 2Crisis
...
γlN−n All Crisis
ηyt is γyt with probability piit, and equals 1 otherwise.
ηpyt =

1 0Crisis
γy1 1Crisis
γy2 2Crisis
...
γyN−n All Crisis
As before, γy1 ≤ γy2 ≤ ... ≤ γyN−n . There are externalities associated with leverage
taken by one household onto all other households. One crisis event lowers the income
of all households that are holding debt, as well as decreasing the debt level of all
households. because of this risk, the cost of borrowing increases as well.
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First Order Condition
1
cit
= Et(
ρ
qtcit+1
) + λit
1
cit
=
j
hit
+ ρEt(
1− δ
cit+1
) +mtλit
4.3.3 Equilibrium Conditions
The asset market clears: ∑
i
dt =
∑
i
lt
Which should also imply goods market clearing:
∑
i
(cit + (hit − (1− δ)hit−1)) +
∑
i
φ(dit − di) =
∑
i
yit
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary stochastic
processes {ht, ct, dt, lt, qt} satisfying the Euler condition and individual budget con-
straints, and the market clearing condition given the processes yt, {ht−1, ct−1, dt−1, lt−1, qt−1},
mt and the crisis probabilities. Set N = {5,50,500} as a benchmark and experiment
with increasing N. We set the number of impatient agents in the economy to be 65%.
4.3.4 Solution Method and Calibration
As a test of concept, start with a five agent economy (2 patient agents and 3 impatient
agents), and use the Dynare method of linearization around the steady state. As
stated in Kumhoff et. al., having probability in the model means large deviations
from the original steady state, and some form of global solution method should be
more appropriate. These solution methods will be explored up on in a latter section
of the paper.
Calibrations mostly follow Iacoviello, as well as Kumhof and Ranciere.
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βt Patient Discount factor 0.99
βb Impatient Discount factor 0.96
ζ Housing Preference Parameter 0.3
δ Housing Depreciation Rate 0.04
ψ Asset Adjustment Cost Parameter 0.02
di Asset Adjustment Parameter 0.5
γl Asset Reduction After Crisis 0.75
γy Output Reduction After Crisis 0.97
φ0 Probabilistic Function Parameter 0.5
φ1 Probabilistic Function Parameter 0.1
yt,ss Steady State Top Income 1.1
yb,ss Steady State Bottom Income 1
Table 4.1: Inequality and Crisis Model Calibrations
4.4 Impulse Response Functions
Find the steady state, and find the model parameters based on the policy rules.
Processes for output, and crisis values.
4.4.1 Common Rise in Patient Household Income
A rise in the income of patient households rises their consumption and consumption
of durables. But their desire to lend funds also increases greatly, and as a result
interest rate falls dramatically, which enhances the budget of impatient households
and their consumption rises as well. There is a small rise in consumption of the
impatient households, while their borrowing increases.
As a result of that, crisis probability increases.
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Figure 4·3: IRF: Top Income Shock
Temporary shock to income of top households. Top Income Shock on Financial Variables.
Temporary shock to income of top households: Responses to loss in assets, decline in
output and probability of default.
4.4.2 Common Rise in Impatient Household Income
When there is a temporary rise in the income of the impatient household, They
take this opportunity to purchase more non-durable and durable goods. So they loan
more money to purchase the durable goods. But this act actually raises loan demand,
and as a result interest rate rises. The expected crisis probability however declines,
because of the rise in income of the impatient households.
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Figure 4·4: IRF: Bottom Income Shock
Temporary rise in income of impatient households. Temporary shock to income of
impatient households: Responses to loss in assets, decline in output and probability of
default.
Shocks to either households seem to raise consumption in durable and non-durables
and increase the indebtedness of bottom households. However there are a few dif-
ferences. First of all, bottom households consumption rise is much larger when the
income rise is assigned to them. Secondly, interest rate goes up in the scenario when
impatient households get the shock in income, while in the scenario where rich house-
holds get the rise in income, interest rate is depressed. Lastly, in the case where poor
households get the increase income shock, probability of crisis actually declines.
4.4.3 Common Relaxation in Financial Constraint
Impatient households are all assumed to be credit constrained. When the constraint
relaxes, they will all demand more loans; Ironically, this would bid up the interest rate
so much so that it actually induces less borrowing and less consumption conducted
by the impatient households. Crisis probability would also declines. Rich households
meanwhile consume more in durables and non-durables and extend less lending.
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Figure 4·5: IRF: Borrowing Constraint
Temporary shock in impatient household borrowing constraint. Temporary shock to
income of top households: responses to loss in assets, decline in output and probability of
default.
When all households suddenly have their borrowing constraint relaxed, there is
too much demand for loans that it actually shoots up interest rate so much so that
the debt accumulation slows, and crisis probability initially declines. The rise in
interest rate is so great that the next period, it also produces a bounce back of crisis
probability.
It is unclear whether the universal relaxation of the credit constraint is a good
description of the U.S. economy in the late 2000’s. In terms of the facts, debt accu-
mulation has actually risen, while consumption and housing has all increased. Also,
it is the case that people that tended to borrow more in the run-up to the crisis are
all in the middle income class, while the very poor households did not experience the
large rise in consumption.
4.4.4 Idiosyncratic Shock to Patient Household Income
Idiosyncratic shock to a top household means they will consume more in durables
and non-durables, as well as supply more assets for lending. This pushes down the
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interest rate; a decline in interest rate causes the budget to tighten for other patient
households so their consumption declines. Due to poor households’ additional demand
of asset in low interest rate scenarios to invest in durable goods, interest rate decline
is not large enough and they supply more asset.
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Figure 4·6: IRF: Top Income Shock on Patient Households
Temporary shock to income of top households: typical response of other rich households.
Temporary shock to income of top households: typical response of poor households.
For poor households, consumption and borrowing increases due to the decline in
interest rate. With the rise in borrowing without rise in income, probability of crisis
increases.
4.4.5 Idiosyncratic Shock to Impatient Household Income
A shock to one of the bottom households causes their consumption to rise. They also
take the opportunity to invest more in durables, which implies more borrowing. Rise
in their income means their personal crisis probability declines. Since they pushed
up the interest rate, other impatient households consumes more today and borrow
less, but not enough to counteract the rising interest rate and as a result their crisis
probability rises. Rich households meanwhile will lend more and purchase more.
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Figure 4·7: IRF: Bottom Income Shock on Patient Households
Temporary shock to income of bottom households: Typical response of rich households.
Temporary shock to income of bottom households: Typical response of poor households.
4.4.6 Idiosyncratic Shock to Borrowing Constraint
A relaxation of borrowing constraint for a particular impatient household equates to
higher borrowing of that particular household. but this means that their personal
crisis probability has risen, which pushes up the overall interest rate of the economy.
As a result, they are not able to afford more consumption today, and consumption in
durables decline and increase with a lag. Other unaffected impatient households will
consume less and borrow less, due to the rise in interest rate.
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Figure 4·8: IRF: Borrowing Constraint on Patient Households
Temporary shock to borrowing constraint of bottom households: Typical response of a
rich household. Temporary shock to borrowing constraint of bottom households: Typical
response of a poor household.
Due to the rise in crisis probability, and the fact that other impatient households
are not borrowing to push up interest rate further, rich households rather consume
more in durables and non-durables then extend lending.
The relaxation in borrowing constraint of a particular impatient household in-
creases crisis probability for them so much that they alone are the ones that are
taking on the increase loans and risk in the economy, while their consumption pat-
tern or other impatient households consumption pattern does not improve much and
inequality in wealth actually widens.
4.4.7 Consumption Externality
In the previous section, the form is externality is pecuniary; the debt undertaking
of one household increases their crisis probability, and brings up the severity of the
financial crisis, which is priced in the cost of debt. Here I added consumption ex-
ternality as in chapter one. In each of the scenarios, the impatient households take
disutility from the consumption gap they have between the richest household.
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Figure 4·9: IRF: Top Income Shock
Temporary shock to income of top households. Top Income Shock on Financial Variables.
Temporary shock to income of top households: Responses to loss in assets, decline in
output and probability of default.
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Figure 4·10: IRF: Top Income Shock
Temporary shock to income of top households. Top Income Shock on Financial Variables.
Temporary shock to income of top households: Responses to loss in assets, decline in
output and probability of default.
Upon examination, it is clear to see that when there is a same shock to the income
of the richest household, when there is consumption externality, the consumption of
the impatient households increases a lot more when there is no consumption exter-
nality. As a result, they consume less in housing, their appetite for consumption
causes the interest rate to increase, and as a result, the debt to disposable income
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ratio increases, and the probability of default, as well as the severity of a common
crisis increases.
4.4.8 Summary of Impulse Responses
Rising inequality in income increases the consumption of the rich households and
the poor households, while putting a downward pressure on interest rate and upward
pressure on economy-wide crisis. The idiosyncratic relaxation of borrowing constraint
on the other hand increases inequality in consumption and concentrates debt on
the hands of those households with constraint relaxed and induces a higher crisis
probability on their loans, all the while putting an upward pressure on the interest
rate.
With rising inequality, in general household debt would increase. idiosyncratic
relaxation of the borrowing constraint concentrates debt in a few households and
drastically increases their default probability.
If every impatient households income is raised, total debt in the economy would
still rise, but default probability would go down. While idiosyncratic rises in some
impatient households’ income benefits these households but through the pecuniary ex-
ternality through the interest rate, causes the default probability of other households’
probability of encountering crisis to rise.
4.5 Chapter Summary
A close relationship between inequality and household debt is observed in a long-run
perspective. Rising household debt is also the precursor of many of the financial crises
experienced since the 1960s. When households borrowing constraint is decreased,
there is an even larger increase in household debt leading to increased probability of
wide economic financial crisis.
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This paper connects rising inequality and the resulting accumulation of household
debt to the probability of system economic crisis. In the model, individual accu-
mulation of debt increases their own probability of default, but the severity of the
financial crisis increases as more households’ default becomes likely. This way, the
debt accumulation behavior of a single household exerts a pecuniary externality on
all other households, through increasing the price of debt. The effect of the pecuniary
externality is seen most clearly when the borrowing constraint of a particular house-
hold is relaxed. when the constraint is relaxed for the particular household, they
accumulate large amounts of debt, and as a result increases the expected severity of
the crisis, and drastically increases the interest rate on existing debt. All households
that borrow are effectively poorer, and as a result borrows even more for the purpose
of consumption smoothing, and the economy-wide probability and severity of crisis
increases even further.
To ensure a stable economic growth path, it is then very important to keep income
inequality in check; not only does rising income inequality lead to larger household
debt, this large run up in debt also leads to increased probability and severity of
financial crisis.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, I have assumed that rising inequality in income played an
important role in the growing indebtedness of a nation’s poor households, and in
the growing indebtedness of a nation’s governments. I asserted that this growing
indebtedness invariably leads to crisis, either manifesting as a household debt crisis,
or as as a sovereign default crisis.
In chapter 1, using panel error correction methods I observe a long-run negative
relationship between top income shares and the current account conditional on highly
progressive marginal income taxes. Current account is aggregate private savings plus
public savings. Since tax revenue rises with top income shares if marginal income
taxes are progressive, the negative conditional relationship can be explained by the
fact that a more progressive marginal income tax system increases the government’s
ability to provide transfers or tax breaks as windfall rise in disposable income to low
income households, who become more avid consumers even as their income share in
national output declines. I incorporate these findings into a dynamic two-country
general equilibrium model to study the effects of top and bottom income tax cuts
on the home country’s current account and fiscal balance. Along rises in top income
shares, a tax cut to the top at the margin improves the current account, but hurts the
fiscal balance through revenue reduction. While a bottom tax cut lowers the current
account balance but doesn’t have much of an adverse impact on the fiscal balance.
In chapter 2, inequality increases the probability of sovereign default; the sovereign
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borrows for the purpose of redistribution, and also to cover government expenditure.
Default on sovereign bonds occur when the one time increase in utility of poor house-
holds due to higher transfers outweigh the risk of remaining in autarky for an extended
period of time. Government income tax policy to redistribute income also affect the
sovereign’s decision to default, and this paper studies the behavior of a nation’s
sovereign defaultable bond accumulation in the face of inequality for the purpose of
aiding poor consumption, and how does progressive income tax policies reduce the
probability of sovereign default motivated by income inequality.
In chapter 3, accumulation of household debt contributes to the probability of
household default, which leads to an initial decrease in inequality but persistent rises
afterwards. Idiosyncratic rises in income of impatient households increase their bor-
rowing due to rise in consumption of durable goods, but acts as a pecuniary exter-
nality on other impatient households as they drive up the risk of the economy-wide
crisis, and as a result, budget of all impatient household rises and crisis probability
increases.
As for directions of future research, the breadth of reach of the topics stated above
needs to extend further. One area of expansion is to consider how the taxation and
fiscal policies aimed at reducing inequality or at promoting growth gains momentum
under a democratic political system. In an economy populated by borrowers and
lenders, there would be a clear differential in preference for tax policy depending
on the amount of debt versus asset, and the productivity of each household. They
resulting voting equilibrium on capital taxation would have important applications
for the current U.S. economy and beyond.
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5.1 Where to Go from Here
As the most recent global financial crisis fades into memory, economic growth goes
on an upswing, we are beginning to see the patterns of rising inequality as well as the
return of confidence in the market for debt. The question of how and when the next
crisis will hit and to which sector of the market intimately related to the financial
market yet remains. This thesis urges policy makers to take a closer look at the
experience of inequality within the nation, and examine the set of policies aimed at
inequality reduction as well as the set of polices regulating the financial markets, to
ask whether the growth of inequality in income and wealth has become too much, or
whether household or national debt has grown too much and are elevating the risk of
the next crisis.
While an unequal path of growth hurts only the poor, an unequal path of fragile
growth hurts the rich and the poor alike. In sustaining growth, the issue of inequality,
and financial market sustainability cannot be left unaddressed; in my opinion these
issues will be the most important ones we answer that determines the fate of our
society going forward in the twenty-first century.
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